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INTRODUCTION

In recent years the world has seen a massive wave of constitutional change, most notably in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and
South Africa. As this Article goes to press, the United States and its
allies are beginning the process of creating a new constitution for
Iraq. Here at home, there is an ongoing debate over how best to
structure change in our own constitutional system.
Yet our understanding of the processes of constitutional change
remains in many ways inadequate.' A particularly poorly understood issue is the role of voter knowledge. This Article represents
the first effort to determine empirically whether voter knowledge
increases during periods of constitutional change, thereby enabling
voters to impose heightened constraints on political elites.2 The
answer to this question is important, not only for the empirical
study of constitutional change, but also for the ongoing normative
debate over how such change should be structured. As discussed
more fully below, the problem of voter knowledge has crucial
implications for the longstanding debate between those constitutional theorists who claim that Article V of the U.S. Constitution
should be the sole legal means of constitutional change and
those-now led by Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar-who contest
this proposition.3
In all democratic nations that undergo constitutional change,
voters are given a role in constitutional development. For both
normative and empirical reasons, it is obviously important to
understand how they play that role. Numerous political philosophers have argued that voter control of government is intrinsically
valuable.' Even many who do not share this view believe that voter
1. See, e.g., Essay, Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making
Process, 45 DuKE L.J. 364, 364-65 (1995) (discussing a large number of open research
questions on the subject of constitution making).
2. A recent study by Barry Cushman reviews 1930s survey evidence on public opinion
regarding various issues relevant to New Deal-era constitutional change. See generally Barry
Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in the
1930s, 50 BuFF. L. REV. 7 (2002). However, Cushman does not attempt to measure either
voter knowledge or the degree to which voters were able to constrain political elites. See id.
3. See infra notes 7, 14, 22 (citing works by Ackerman, Amar, and their critics).
4. For arguments asserting the intrinsic value of democratic participation, see BENJAMIN
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control is instrumentally valuable as a check on the power of
political elites.' Robert Dahl, perhaps the most influential analyst
of democracy among modern scholars, asserts that "a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens."6
An essential element of voter participation in constitutional
change, as in "normal politics,"7 is that the electorate be adequately
informed.' Without adequate knowledge, voters cannot monitor and
control the actions of their elected representatives. Voter knowledge
is perhaps even more important in constitutional decision making
than in normal politics. Almost by definition, a change in constitutional structure is difficult to reverse. On the other hand, an
ordinary policy failure brought on by voter ignorance can potentially be rectified by voting out the government that sponsored the
policy in the next election-a process epitomized by the concept of
"retrospective voting. 9 In constitutional politics, by contrast, it is
much more important that voters "get it right" the first time around,
as another opportunity may not arise for many years, if at all.
Unfortunately, decades of voter-knowledge research has shown
that knowledge levels are usually shockingly low." Most citizens
R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY xiii-xiv (1984); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 104-05 (1970).
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 6 (1982) (endorsing

instrumental value of democracy as a mechanism for popular replacement of political elites).
6. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY 1 (1971).

7. The distinction between"constitutional moments" and 'normal politics" was developed
by Bruce Ackerman. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-33 (1991)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 11.
8. See, e.g., MICHAELX. DzLa CARPINI &SCo0rKEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABour
POLTICS AND WHY ITMATTERS 63-65 (1996) (explaining importance of political knowledge to
the democratic process); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the DemocraticIdeal, 12 CRITICAL
REV. 413 (1998) (pointing out dangers of voter ignorance and analyzing literature on the
subject).
9. For the classic analyses of retrospective voting, see MORRIS P. FIORINA,
RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981); V.0. KEY, JR., THE
RESPONSmLE ELECTORATE (1966).
10. For summaries of the extensive evidence of deep and widespread voter ignorance, see
DELLI CARPiNI & KEETER, supra note 8, at 62-104; Somin, supra note 8, at 416-17. For an
analysis of the implications of widespread voter ignorance for other issues in constitutional
law, see Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty: A New
Perspective on the 'Central Obsession" of ConstitutionalTheory, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2004).
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lack even basic political information," and close to one-third are so
completely ignorant that one leading scholar categorizes them as
"know-nothings."' Thus, it is essential to know whether this dismal
pattern holds true in periods when fundamental constitutional
change is on the political agenda.
The issue of voter knowledge and its relationship to constitutional change has implications for two other important strands of
scholarly literature: theories of the growth of government and
normative theories of constitutional change. Many theories of
government growth point to the ability of governments to exploit
periods of crisis-especially periods of crisis massive enough to
engender constitutional change-to expand their powers beyond
what is necessary to resolve the crisis at hand. 3 What these writers
fail to explain is why voters allow political leaders to expand their
power to such an extent, sometimes even to expand it in ways that
do not address the crisis at all. Voter ignorance may be a crucial
part of the story, in that measures taken for other reasons may be
packaged to ill-informed voters as crisis management strategies.
In recent years, a number of prominent legal scholars, notably
Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar, have advocated supplementing
the cumbersome amendment procedures of Article V of the Constitution with procedures that allow amendment through majoritarian
voting processes.14 Article V requires constitutional amendments to
11. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 8, at 417 (noting that most survey respondents do not
know basic information such as the names of their senators and representatives and the
functions of different branches of government).

12. See Stephen Earl Bennett, "Know-Nothings' Revisited: The Meaning of Political
Ignorance Today, 69 SOc. SCd. Q. 476,476, 483 (1988) (utilizing the term "know-nothings" as
first coined by Hyman and Sheatsley in 1947 "to refer to those steeped in political ignorance").
13. See, e.g., ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEvIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 17-18 (1987) (presenting extensive evidence that government
grows in times of crisis); JONATHAN R.T. HUGHES, THE GOVERNMENTAL HABrr 146-98 (1977)
(analyzing the growth of government during and after the New Deal era).
14. See, e.g., AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 53-56; BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 414-16 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
2]; AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY
SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 3 passim (1998); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional

Politics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989) [hereinafter Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics];Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed ConstitutionalAmendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent of the Governed]; Akhil
Reed Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution OutsideArticle V, 55 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1043 (1988); cf Stephen M, Griffin, The Nominee is ... Article V, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
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run the forbidding gauntlet of gaining the support of two-thirds
majorities in both houses of Congress, followed by ratification by
three-quarters of the state legislatures.' Throughout American
history, critics of Article V have sought to replace or supplement it
16
with a more majoritarian alternative.
Perhaps the most important defense of such proposals is the
claim that they represent the considered will of We the People, to
cite the titles of Ackerman's books,"7 and the informed Consent of
the Governed, to cite the title of one of Amar's influential articles.18
Ackerman's and Amar's criticisms of Article V are but the latest in
a long line of similar attacks dating back to the Anti-Federalists.
For example, Patrick Henry argued at the Virginia ratifying
convention that Article V's obstruction of the will of the majority
would lead to the destruction of American liberty "forever." 9 Henry
condemned Article V for enabling "a contemptible minority" to
"prevent the good of the majority. " ' This longstanding argument for
171(1995) (describing Article V as a"constitutional stupidity"); Sanford Levinson,Accounting
for ConstitutionalChange (Or, How Many Times has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) >26; (D) all of the above), 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409 (1991)
(arguing that non-Article V amendments are a necessary element of constitutional change,
but without endorsing Ackerman and Amar's majoritarian rationale for them).
15. See U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V also allows for amendments to be proposed by a
convention of all the states instead of by Congress, see id, but this method has never been
used successfully and seems highly unlikely to be resorted to in the future. In any event,
amendments proposed by the convention still must be ratified by three-quarters of state
legislatures, ensuring that a strong supermajority is still needed for an amendment to pass.
Id
16. See generally JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN
PoLITICAL THOUGHT 137-56 (1992) [hereinafter VLE, THE CONSTETONAL AMENDING
PROCESS] (describing two centuries of criticism of Article V); John R. Vile, American Views of
the ConstitutionalAmending Process:An Intellectual History of Article V, 35 AM. J. LEGAL
HisT. 44 (1991).
17. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7; ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2, supra note
14.
18. Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 14.
19. ViLE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS, supra note 16, at 33 (quoting Patrick
Henry).
20. Patrick Henry, Speeches of Patrick Henry in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention
(June 5, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIS. WRITINGS BY THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION
293, 302 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985) [hereinafter THE ANTI-FEDERALIST]. Other AntiFederalists also attacked Article V for similar reasons. The Federal Farmer, a leading AntiFederalist writer, criticized the Article for "transfer[ring" power "from the many to the few."
The Federal Farmer, Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of
Government Proposed by the Late Convention; And to Several Essential and Necessary
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non-Article V constitutional revision would be strengthened by
evidence showing that voters in times of constitutional change
actually have sufficient knowledge to make meaningful decisions.
Conversely, it would be weakened if majoritarian voting processes
during periods of constitutional change are primarily conduits for
voter ignorance.
Given the critical role of voter knowledge in the process of
constitutional change, it is perhaps surprising that neither the
literature on constitutional transitions, nor the equally impressive
literature on voter knowledge contains a study of the role of voter
knowledge during periods of constitutional upheaval.2 ' There is,
likewise, no study that attempts to analyze the extent to which
voters are able to control the constitutional change process. Neither
the advocates of non-Article V constitutional change nor their critics
who defend Article V's claim to be the exclusive legitimate mode of
constitutional change have even attempted to investigate this
important issue.2 2

In this Article, these questions are addressed by examining the
behavior of both voters and elites during the New Deal era, the
most important and wide-ranging period of constitutional change in
Alterations in It. In a Number of Letters from the FederalFarmerto the Republican, in THE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 23, 59. A very similar criticism is advanced by a leading modem
political scientist. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONsrmIoNAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE
GOVERNMENT 13-14 (1986).
21. A rare exception is JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986), which shows
how both supporters and opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) attempted to
exploit voter ignorance by exaggerating the ERA's likely impact for good or ill. Id. at 29-35.
However, Professor Mansbridge does not examine the actual state of voter knowledge, nor
does she attempt to embed her findings in a broader theory of the role of voters in
constitutional change. See id. Instead, she focuses primarily on the role played by small
groups of political activists on both sides. See id.
22. For arguments in favor of Article V exclusivity, see, for example, DAVID E. KYVIG,
ExpLIcITAND ATHENTic ATs: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 476 (1996);
Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of ConstitutionalChange, 65 TENN. L. REV.
155, 243-44 (1997); David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORYAND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 117,118 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995); David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case
of Article V, 76 IowA L. REV. 1, 63 (1990); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the Peoplefs],Original
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 121, 177 (1996);
John R. Vile, Legally Amending the United States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article
V's Mechanisms, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 271, 274 (1991). These works, many of them otherwise
very thorough, follow their anti-Article V competitors in neglecting the significance of voter
knowledge.
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American history since the Civil War. This work is the first part of
a broader research project investigating the relationship between
voter knowledge and constitutional change.
In Part I of the Article, I define the concept of constitutional
change used in my analysis and also explain the reasons why voter
knowledge in periods of constitutional change should be analyzed
separately from voter knowledge in periods of "normal" politics.
Part II lays out the opposing hypotheses of the heightened
attention and rational ignorance theories. The former predicts that
voter knowledge should increase during periods of constitutional
change because voters are more likely to pay attention to the
unusually important political issues that arise during these times.
The latter, by contrast, predicts that voter knowledge should
remain relatively constant because the reluctance of voters to invest
in the costly process of acquiring substantial political knowledge is
a rational result of the insignificance of the individual vote. Part III
shows that the New Deal era was an especially important period of
constitutional change that provides a critical testing ground for the
opposing theories.
In Part IV, I examine survey evidence of voter knowledge during
the New Deal period. This evidence strongly suggests that there
was no significant increase in voter information levels. Also in Part
IV, I briefly address some survey data relevant to the question of
elite constraint.
Part V looks at voter knowledge from the perspective of elite
political leaders. It examines three critical cases-the National
Industrial Recovery Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the
battle over President Roosevelt's plan to "pack" the Supreme
Court-to determine if key political leaders perceived the electorate
as unusually well informed or whether, by contrast, they saw the
constitutional moment as an opportunity for deceptive manipulation of voter ignorance. Sadly, the latter scenario is much more
strongly supported by the evidence than the former.
None of the individual pieces of evidence presented in this
Article-either quantitative or qualitative-is by itself definitive.
Cumulatively, however, they provide strong support for the
conclusion that there was little or no increase in voter knowledge or
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elite constraint during the twentieth century's most important
period of constitutional change.
Part VI of the Article discusses some of the implications of this
finding for normative theories of constitutional change. Although
my results do not refute all possible arguments in favor of nonArticle V constitutional change, they do identify serious shortcomings in some of the best-known such claims. Moreover, I argue that
the problem of voter ignorance provides an unanticipated positive
rationale for the much maligned supermajority requirements of
Article V. This point is significant because even prominent scholars
who do not fully endorse the arguments of Ackerman and Amar
have been troubled by the absence of a positive justification for this
critical element of the Constitution's amendment process. Sanford
Levinson, for example, admits that he "can think of no good reasons
to support the formal stasis engendered by Article V."' The issue
of voter knowledge thus turns out to be a critical one for both the
normative and empirical study of constitutional change.
I. ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS
The absence of prior studies of the relationship between voter
knowledge and constitutional change does not, in and ofitself, prove
that such a study is needed. The gap in the existing literature may
be a case of justifiable benign neglect rather than a lamentable
lacuna. Thus, it is important to define what I mean by constitutional change and explain why it requires an analysis of its own.
A Defining ConstitutionalChange
For present purposes, I define constitutional change as a major,
difficult to reverse, alteration in the structure of government or the
distribution of government power. This definition is in line with the
definition endorsed by Bruce Ackerman, who stresses that "higher
lawmaking," as he refers to constitutional change, is defined in part
23. Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 CoNer.
CoMMENT. 107,123 (1996). Levinson does, however, concede that there may be "good reason'
for imposing a supermajority requirement for constitutional change that limits 'rights of

freedom of speech or freedom of conscience." Id.
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by its deep embeddedness within political institutions, which makes
it difficult or even
impossible to reverse, at least in the course of
24
"normal politics."

This functionalist approach to constitutional change can be
differentiated from a purely legalistic approach that defines
constitutional change as any alteration in the text of a constitution,
but ignores even deep and fundamental alterations that do not
leave a textual imprint. While such a textualist approach may be
appealing as a normative principle of constitutional interpretation,25 it is not useful for purposes of the sort of empirical analysis
that I wish to perform here.
Even scholars sympathetic to the textualist approach as a
normative view concede that important changes in constitutional
structure have taken place, most notably in the New Deal era,
without altering the text.26 Robert Bork, a committed originalist
and formalist, even refers to the New Deal era as a "constitutional
revolution."" To take an even more dramatic case, it is difficult to
doubt, as an empirical matter, that fundamental constitutional
change occurred in Germany after the Nazis took power in 1933
even though Hitler never formally abrogated the Weimar Republic
Constitution or even altered its text.28
The functionalist definition of constitutional change that I use
is necessarily more vague than a narrow textualist definition. In
practice, however, this issue need not be a serious impediment to
this project because the New Deal is a clear example of change that
falls well within the definition, rather than a borderline case over
which definitional debates may arise.
24. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1,supranote 7, at 266-94; ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
2, supra note 14, at 30. In theory, my definition differs from Ackerman's in that his 'higher
lawmaking" can, in principle, be addressed to a comparatively minor issue that does not rise
to the level of a major change in the distribution of government power. In practice, however,
Ackerman recognizes that the kind of mobilization he describes is likely to occur only around
major issues, ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 266-94, and all the cases he
analyzes in his two books represent instances of what would be considered successful or
attempted constitutional change in my terms as well as his own.
25. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23-29 (1997) (defending
textualism as a normative theory of interpretation).
26. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 51-67 (1990); Richard A.
Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1395-99 (1987).
27. BOR, supra note 26, at 51.
28. See ALAN BULLOCK, HITLER: A STUDY IN TYRANNY 403 (1964).
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B. Why a SeparateAnalysis?
In light of the extensive existing literature on voter knowledge,2 9
one may ask why we require a separateanalysis of voter knowledge
in periods of constitutional change. There are three important
answers. First, constitutional change differs from ordinary policy
change in that a constitutional change is a one-time decision which
is very difficult to reverse. This means that it is more important
that voters "get it right" the first time, requiring that they be more
informed than would be necessary for an "ordinary" election.
Second, constitutional change gives voters considerably less
opportunity to employ some of the standard "shortcuts" to knowledge posited in the literature on ordinary politics. Because a
decision in favor of constitutional change is a decision in favor of an
entirely new framework for government policy rather than just a
particular policy change, "retrospective voting"30 is less likely to be
effective. Effective retrospection may tell us that the prior government (for instance, the Hoover Administration in 1932) has failed,
but it is of limited utility in determining whether an entirely new
institutional structure will be preferable. Retrospective voting is of
even less utility in determining whether the proposed new constitutional system should be retained indefinitely, far beyond the end of
the immediate crisis at hand. Yet, a decision on constitutional
change is by definition a decision in favor of the latter and not just
the former.
Similarly, using cues from trusted "opinion leaders" 1 or political
parties3 2 may not be helpful if the question at hand is whether to
29. For critical summaries of the literature, see DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 8;
ERIC R.A.N. SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1989); Morris P. Fiorina, Voting
Behavior,in DENNIS C. MUELLER, PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 391 (1997);

Somin, supranote 8.
30. For defenses of the theory of retrospective voting, see FIORINA, supra note 9; KEY,
supra note 9; Helmut Norpoth, Presidentsand the Prospective Voter, 58 J. POL. 776 (1996).
31. For shortcut theories emphasizing the role of trusted opinion leaders as guides for
less-informed voters, see ARTHUR LuPiA & MATrHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA 35-36 (1998); James A. Stimson, A Macro Theory of Information Flow, in
INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 345, 345 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski
eds., 1990).
32. For shortcut theories emphasizing the informational benefits of political parties, see
JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? 48-50 (1995); KEY, supranote 9, at 52-55; Morris P. Fiorina,
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reject the entire framework of government espoused by these
leaders or parties in favor of a wholly new one advocated by their
opponents. Voters cannot easily assume that opinion leaders who
have given good guidance on normal political issues will be able to
do the same on the much more complex constitutional ones.
Finally, information from everyday life"3 is also unlikely to be
useful because everyday life does not provide voters with experiences that would enable them to evaluate a new constitutional
regime that has never existed in their country previously. In sum,
even those who are confident in the utility of shortcuts to political
knowledge under normal conditions may be more skeptical of these
mechanisms under conditions of constitutional change.' This
circumstance increases the importance of individual-level political
knowledge.
The third justification for a separate analysis of constitutional
change is that at least two important theoretical perspectives make
diametrically opposed predictions regarding the role of voter
knowledge in periods of constitutional change. The first of these
theories is based on the work of Bruce Ackerman,' and on the
closely related research tradition growing out of studies of realign-

An Outline for a Model of Party Choice, 21 AM. J. POL. Sci. 601, 614-18 (1977).
33. The political utility of information derived from everyday life was first noted by
Anthony Downs. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 221-25 (1957).
Political scientist Samuel Popkin has made the most sweeping recent claims for the
effectiveness of this information shortcut. See SAMUEL L. POPmIN, THE REASONING VOTER
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESmENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 23-28 (2d ed. 1994)
[hereinafter POPKIN, REASONING VOTER]; Samuel L. Popkin, Information Shortcuts and the
Reasoning Voter, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE 17, 17-18 (Bernard Grofman
ed., 1993) [hereinafter Popkin, Information).
34. For skeptical recent treatments of shortcuts even in the normal context, see MICHAEL
ALVAREZ, INFORMATION AND ELECTIONS 152-56 (1997); DELL! CARPINI & KETER, supra note
8, at 51-55; Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: InformationEffects in PresidentialElections,
40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194, 194 (1996); Diana C. Mut, Directand Indirect Routes to Politicizing
PersonalExperience: Does Knowledge Make a Difference?,57 PUB. OPINION Q. 483 (1993); Ilya
Somin, Book Note, Resoluing the DemocraticDilemma?, 16 YALE J.ON REG. 401,402-03 (1999)
(reviewing LUtIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 31). For a detailed critique of the major shortcut
theories advanced in the political science literature, see Somin, supra note 8, at 419-31. Cf
Somin, supra note 10 (discussing relevance of the critique of shortcut theories to judicial
review).
35. See generally ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1,supra note 7; ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
2, supra note 14; Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics,supra note 14.
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ment.3 6 I derive the second theory from collective action17 and
rational ignorance 8 theories.

To summarize briefly, the first theory-the heightened attention
hypothesis-predicts that voters should increase their knowledge
levels during periods of constitutional change. This increased
knowledge in turn enables them to have greater control over policy
outcomes. 39 The theory of rational ignorance, by contrast, predicts
almost exactly the opposite. It suggests that voter knowledge, while
perhaps not declining in an absolute sense, will be relatively more
inadequate in times of constitutional change. It also implies that
political elites, not voters, should have greater control over policy
outcomes in times of constitutional change.
II. TWO APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Unfortunately, there has not been a previous attempt to specify
fully the predicted implications of either of these theories for voter
knowledge and its impact in periods of constitutional change. Here,
I attempt to do so.
A The HeightenedAttention Hypothesis
Ackerman's theory of constitutional change is apparently the only
existing theory that explicitly incorporates voter knowledge as a key
variable. ' He argues that "constitutional moments" are characterized by heightened attention to political issues by a normally
passive and apathetic public."' Accepting the conclusions of a
36. For the classic works on realignment, see WALTER DAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL
ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITIcS (1970); JAMES L. SUNnQUsrT,
DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES INTHE
UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1983).
37. For the most important accounts of collective action theory as applied to political
participation, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d prtg. 1971) [hereinafter OLSON, LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION];
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).

38. The concept of rational ignorance was introduced by Anthony Downs. See DOWNS,
supranote 33, at 240-59.
39. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 285-88.
40. Although Ackerman limits the applicability of his theory to the United States only,
see, for example, id. at 6-7, most of its features are applicable more generally.
41. Id. at 285-88.
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generation of voter knowledge research, Ackerman admits that
"citizens normally haven't gathered enough information for an
informed opinion [on public policy issues] .42 He argues, however,
that in a constitutional moment, voters will make "special efforts"
to increase their knowledge--efforts they would not make during
times of normal politics.' He even goes so far as to predict that in
a true constitutional moment, an average citizen will have "deliberated as much about her commitment to a national ideal as she
thinks appropriate in making a considered judgment on an
important decision in her private life.""
The reasoning underlying Ackerman's prediction is relatively
straightforward. In times of normal politics, most voters pay little
or no attention to political developments because of rational
ignorance' and their need to attend to other aspects of their lives."
Usually as the result of a great crisis, a political movement is able
to place large-scale constitutional change on the agenda. This raises
the stakes of politics and therefore leads voters to pay more attention and become more knowledgeable about the alternatives facing
them. 7 Once this stage of "mobilized deliberation" is reached, the
would-be reformers can prevail if they obtain sufficient depth and
breadth of support from voters."
Such support enables them to obtain overwhelming majorities in
the legislative and executive, and indirectly in the judicial, branches
of government. This in turn allows them to impose their agenda
relatively free of preexisting constitutional constraints."9 The
heightened attention that voters pay to political issues during
Ackermanian "constitutional moments" also enables the electorate
to exert greater control over political outcomes than normally
possible."

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 272.
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 273-74.
See DOWNS, supra note 33, at 244-47.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 271-72.
Id. at 285-88.
See id. at 272-77.
See id. at 288-90.

50. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2, supra note 14, at 4-5.

2003]

ASSESSING THE NEW DEAL EXPERIENCE

609

Heightened attention during "constitutional moments" need not,
in Ackerman's view, necessarily result in successful constitutional
change.5 ' It may lead voters to reject the reformers' proposals as
well as accept them. Ackerman sees the establishment of the
Constitution in the 1780s, the Reconstruction Amendments of the
1860s, and the New Deal as examples of successful "constitutional
moments." 2 By contrast, he characterizes the 1890s Populists, the
1960s Great Society liberalism, and the 1980s New Right as serious
efforts to achieve constitutional change that led to increased voter
attention but failed to gain their full objectives for lack of sufficient
popular support.53 In each case, Ackerman concludes that the
reform movements were able to achieve some of their policy
objectives by means of normal politics, but were unable to institutionalize their agendas through the Constitution."
Ackerman's model is similar to and in part derived from models
of political realignment.' These theories posit that a "realigning"
election occurs when a critical new issue arises that reorients the
political spectrum around itself and leads to widespread and
semipermanent shifts of blocs of voters from one party to another56
Alternatively, the new issue may be so destructive to the existing
57
party system that one or both major parties disappear altogether.
As in Ackerman's theory, realignment theory posits un-usual
periods during which voters focus intensely on a particular set of
issues."
In American history, these periods coincide nicely with
Ackerman's "constitutional moments." Ackerman sees successful
51. See, e.g., id. at 248 (describing the Populist movement as a failed "constitutional

moment").
52. See id. at 8-26.
53. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 56, 108-13; ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE 2, supranote 14, at 26-27, 248.
54. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 111-12 (stating that while the

Populists had many *normal" political victories, they failed to create a constitutional change).
55. Ackerman himself has acknowledged the links between his theory and realignment
theory. See id at 329 n.1. For works on realignment theory, see BURNHAM, supra note 36;
SUNDQUIST, supranote 36. For the classic article by V.0. Key, Jr., see V.0. Key, Jr., A Theory
of CriticalElections, 17 J. POL. 3 (1955).

56. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 36, at 35-37.
57. Id at 30-34, 36.
58. Id- at 36.
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"constitutional moments" during the 1860s and 1930s,59 and partial
successes ending in failure during the 1890s, 1960s and 1980s,
when, he argues, Great Society liberals and New Right conservatives respectively attempted to achieve constitutional change but
were thwarted by failure to gain sufficient popular support.'
Likewise, realignment theorists see successful realignments in the
1850s, 1890s, and 1930s, while simultaneously observing partial
"dealignments" that weakened the existing system of party
alignments but did not fully displace it in the 1960s and 1980s."1
This coincidence is striking. Undoubtedly, the explanation is that
issues so fundamental and so salient that they result in a serious
challenge to the existing constitutional order are also likely to
threaten the existing party system.
Realignment theory also implicitly dovetails with Ackerman's
theory in another respect. Just as Ackerman's view implies heightened voter control over policy outcomes with respect to the issues
that give rise to constitutional change, realignment theory implies
heightened party responsiveness to voter opinion with respect to
the realignment issue. In theory, the latter could mean merely
"position-taking"62 by the parties rather than any actual impact on
policy outcomes, but the realignment theorists clearly imply that
policy outcomes are also implicated.'
There are, however, two differences between Ackerman's theory
and realignment theory. First, a realignment need not involve a
challenge to the existing constitutional system. It could involve
merely a disagreement over the use of powers that the state already
possesses. Challengers to the existing system may simply wish to
use those powers for different ends rather than augment them,
diminish them, or change their distribution between different
branches or levels of government. This distinction, however, is not
of great moment to the present study, which seeks to focus specifically on periods of constitutional change. Although realignment
59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
60. See 8upra note 53 and accompanying text.
61. See SUNDQUnI, supra note 36, at 74-105, 134-69, 198-239, 376-411, 425-49.
62. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECMON 61 (1974).

63. Sundquist in particular refers to policy outcomes at numerous points in his analysis.
See, e.g., SUNDQUIST, supra note 36, at 208-14 (discussing the different policies of Herbert
Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Great Depression).
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theory may be more broadly applicable, it is clearly applicable to at
least these cases. Moreover, as noted above, in practice, cases of
6
realignment and cases of constitutional change seem to coincide.
The second difference between Ackerman's theory and realignment theory is more consequential to this Article. While Ackerman
explicitly predicts that periods of constitutional change should see
heightened voter knowledge," the realignment theorists predict
merely heightened issue salience for voters.' While the realignment
theorists do not discuss the implications of their theories for voter
knowledge directly, it is theoretically possible that voters may
attach greater importance to the issue than before without knowing
more about it. The latter, however, seems intuitively implausible in
the case of an issue, which, as realignment theory posits, rises from
relative insignificance to being the main organizing principle of a
new political alignment. Thus, it is likely that heightened voter
knowledge is a predictable, observable implication of realignment
theory, although this conclusion is not as strong as in the case of
Ackerman's theory of constitutional change.
To summarize, the heightened attention hypothesis derived from
Ackerman's theory and, to a lesser degree, from realignment theory
makes two major predictions:
(1)

Voters should pay more attention to the issues at stake
during a period of constitutional change and become more
knowledgeable about them.67

(2)

This heightened knowledge enables voters to exercise
greater control over policy outcomes within the key policy
areas at issue.'

1. Implicationsfor Voter Behavior
The first prediction implies that voters should know more about
both the specific issues at stake and about what Michael Delli
64. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
65. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 285-88.
66. See BURNHAM, supra note 36, at 7-8; SuNDQUIST, supra note 36, at 35.
67. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 285-88.

68. Id.
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Carpini and Scott Keeter call "rules of the game" knowledge about
the political system.69 The latter type of knowledge includes
information about the distribution of power within the political
system. In a period of attempted constitutional change, this type of
knowledge is even more crucial than at other times because
constitutional change is, of course, a change in the "rules" whose
merits cannot be assessed easily without knowing about the rules
of the existing system and how they connect to substantive issues.
In addition to increases in voter attention and knowledge,
Ackerman's theory posits heightened voter control over policy
outcomes with respect to the issues at stake in that particular
period of constitutional change.70 On this point, it is vital to
understand that the theory predicts not only greater correspondence between voter preferences and policy than during periods of
normal politics, but more importantly, a fairly high absolute level
of correspondence. Without such correspondence, Ackerman's key
contention-that voter preferences ultimately drive constitutional
change-would be placed into serious doubt.7
2. Implicationsfor Elite Behavior
Among the most underanalyzed aspects of theories of voter
knowledge are their implications for elite behavior. The fundamental insight of Ackerman's argument is that political elites facing a
relatively knowledgeable electorate should behave differently from
ones who face a comparatively ignorant one. 72 Thus, if there is
indeed an upsurge in voter attention during periods of constitutional change, we should observe political leaders taking note of this
fact and attempting to adjust their behavior.
The first and most obvious implication of Ackerman's thesis for
elite behavior is that we should observe political elitesperceivingan
increase in voter knowledge and attention. Although political
elites may misperceive, they have an unusually strong interest in
gauging voter sentiment correctly, since their hopes of election
to office hinge upon it. Though the possibility of complete elite
69. DEL CARPIn & KEETR, supra note 8, at 69-73.
70. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 285-88.
71. Id.

72. See id
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misperception suggests that failure to confirm this prediction
should not lead to the rejection of Ackerman's theory in its entirety,
it would at least undercut Ackerman's prediction of heightened
popular constraint on elites. On the other hand, confirmation of the
prediction would be quite strong evidence in favor of the heightened
attention hypothesis.
A similar but nonetheless distinct implication of Ackerman's
theory is that the elites should perceive themselves as relatively
tightly constrained by voter opinion. In times of constitutional
change, since voters are paying more attention than normal,
policies deviating from public opinion, especially on the issues that
brought about the movement for constitutional change, should run
an unusually high risk of retribution at the polls. Likewise,
Ackerman's theory implies that elites should not view periods of
constitutional change as opportunities to exploit voter ignorance by
misrepresenting the nature of their policies. At least on issues
central to the "constitutional moment" in question, we would expect
little or no such manipulation.
A final prediction for elite behavior is that elites should act on the
above two perceptions: they should alter their policy positions to
take voter sentiment into account. Moreover, they should conform
their policies to the new positions and not make merely rhetorical
changes. By hypothesis, purely rhetorical changes are more likely
to be detected and punished by highly attentive voters.
B. The RationalIgnorance Hypothesis
Since the publication of Anthony Downs' work in 1957, 7" many
political scientists and economists have argued that voters are
"rationally ignorant" about politics.7 Because of the very low
significance of any single vote, 75 there is a vanishingly small payoff
to acquiring political knowledge in order to vote in an informed way.
73. See DOWNS, supra note 33, at 240-59.
74. See, e.g., POPKIN, REASONING VOTER, supra note 33; Mancur Olson, Supply-Side
Economics, IndustrialPolicy, and RationalIgnorance,in THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
245 (Claude E. Barfield & William A. Schambra eds., 1986),
75. See William H. Riker & Peter C. OrdeshookA Theory of the Calculusof Voting, 62 AM.

POL. Sci. REv. 25, 25 (1968) (demonstrating that the chance of any one vote determining the
outcome of a presidential election is roughly 1 in 100 million).
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Of course, even the rationally ignorant voter will likely acquire
some political knowledge from everyday life, 6 because he or she
may find the information interesting or because, for a few groups,
the knowledge is professionally useful.1 7 If the rational ignorance
hypothesis is correct, however, the general level of voter knowledge
likely will be very low. Most existing studies of voter knowledge
confirm this prediction and also find that there has been little
increase in political knowledge over time.7" Other researchers have
found, contrary to the prediction that voter ignorance at the
individual level has a random, self-offsetting effect, 9 that ignorance
has systematic effects that can swing the results of even presidential elections, where voters know more about the candidates than

76. For optimistic accounts of the utility of this shortcut to political information, see
DOWNS, supra note 33, at 221-25; POPKIN, REASONINGVOTER, supranote 33, at 23-28; Popkin,
Information, supra note 33, at 17-22. For criticism, see Mutz, supra note 34; Somin, supra
note 8, at 420-21.
77. See Olson, supra note 74, at 245-46 (pointing out that some citizens, such as interest
group lobbyists, may acquire political knowledge because it is professionally useful to them
for purposes other than voting).
78. See ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER 171-72 (1960) (discussing low
levels of political knowledge in the 1950s); DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 8, at 62
("Since the 1940s, scholarly studies have consistently found that the public is poorly
informed.*); W. RussEL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITIcs 14-17 (1986) ("[Elven the
basic facts of [political knowledge] escape the cognizance of the great majority of the
electorate.*); SMITH, supranote 29, at 191 ('"The public's level of knowledge has not changed
since 1956."); Bennett, supra note 12, at 486 (stating that the same percentage of the public
lacks political knowledge as in the 1940s); Stephen Earl Bennett, Trends in Americans'
PoliticalInformation, 1967-1987,17 AM. POL. Q. 422,423 (1989) (showing little or no increase
in political knowledge over time); Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass
Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206, 246-47 (David E. Apter ed., 1964) (presenting a
classic study showing a low level of political knowledge among American voters); Michael I.
Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, Stability and Change in the U.S. Public'sKnowledge ofPolitics,
55 PUB. OPINION Q. 583, 590 (1991) ("Over 40 years, the level of basic public knowledge of
some basic facts about the political system has remained remarkably stable."); Somin, supra
note 8, at 419.
79. In theory, if voting errors caused by ignorance are distributed randomly across a large
electorate, "mistaken" votes cast in favor of one candidate should be "cancelled out" by other
mistaken votes cast in favor of his or her opponents. In that event, even if the majority of the
electorate is severely deficient in knowledge, their errors would have no effect on electoral
outcomes, which would be decided by the more knowledgeable minority. For defenses of this
position, see BENJAMIN PAGE & ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBIC 16-17 (1992); Phillip

E. Converse, PopularRepresentationand the DistributionofInformation,in INFORMATION AND
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, supra note 31, at 369, 378; Stimson, supra note 31, at 365. For a
critical view, see Somin, supra note 8, at 429-31.
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in other situations. 80 These studies do not, however, specifically
focus on periods of constitutional change. Such periods are of course
the main subject of this Article.
Rational ignorance theory, of course, coexists uneasily with the
apparent failure of the rational choice prediction that voters simply
should not vote. The cost of voting, like that of acquiring information, is likely to be greater than its benefits, at least if the latter are
defined in terms of affecting the outcome of an election. Several
attempts have been made to reconcile the existence of voting with
rational choice theory. 8' Critics of rational choice theory have
sought to refute these efforts.82 This Article will not enter into the
debate except to point out that the apparent failure of rational
choice theory to explain voting need not imply a simultaneous
failure in explaining voter knowledge. The acquisition of political
knowledge is a much more costly, time consuming, and difficult
process than voting. It is not surprising if voters may make a
greater effort to behave rationally in one domain than in the other.'
For present purposes, the key element of the rational ignorance
is that it predicts little or no increase in voter knowledge during
periods of constitutional change. While Ackerman and others are
surely right to argue that periods of constitutional change raise the
stakes of politics, these periods do not significantly increase the
impact of an individual's vote. Thus, the voter has little more reason
to acquire additional political knowledge than he or she would
during periods of normal politics. Moreover, the same level of
80. See ALVAREZ, supra note 34, at 50-51; DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 8, at 26364; Bartels, supra note 34; Thomas Holbrook &James C. Garand, Homo Economus? Economic
Informationand Economic Voting, 49 POL. RES. Q. 351, 367-69 (1996).
81. See, e.g., John H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. Sci. 246, 246

(1993) (arguing that "rational choice accounts of [voter] turnout are possible"); Riker &
Ordeshook, supra note 75, at 25; cf TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS 30-33
(1980) (showing that individuals may take part in the political process because they
overestimate the likelihood that their participation will make a difference). In particular,
Derek Parfit, in a work rarely cited by political scientists and legal scholars, shows how voting
may be rational even for a fully informed, completely rational citizen so long as (1) he

perceives a substantial difference between the opposing candidates, and (2) he places at least
a very small value on the welfare of other citizens and not just on his own. See DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 73-75 (1984).
82. See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS AND DEMOCRACY 13-46 (Phoenix
ed. 1978); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A
CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLrrICAL SCIENCE 33-46 (1994).

83. See Aldrich, supra note 81, at 261-66; Somin, supra note 8, at 437-38.
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absolute knowledge may be relatively less helpful to voters because
the issues involved in constitutional change are more far-reaching
and complex than those of normal politics. Additionally, as discussed above, constitutional change is less easily understood by
means of the standard "shortcuts" to political understanding that
voters employ.84
The predictions of rational ignorance theory for periods of
constitutional change are almost the exact opposite of those made
by the heightened attention hypothesis: voter knowledge should not
increase and voters should have no greater leverage over policy
than normal. Likewise, the elites should not be under the impression that they face unusually strong constraints and they should not
perceive an increase in voter knowledge.
There is one additional implication for elite behavior, however,
that should be spelled out: Far from being unusually constrained,
elites should see opportunities to push agendas of their own that
are not viable during periods of normal politics. Ordinarily, the
power of political leaders is constrained to a degree by the preexisting constitutional framework. The transaction costs of trying to
change this framework are very high, and such change may face
strong opposition.8 5
In a period when constitutional change is on the agenda,
however, these transaction costs are necessarily reduced. A crisis,
such as the Great Depression of the 1930s, leads the population to
be more accepting of possible change. If, as Ackerman predicts, this
change in the public mood is combined with heightened voter
knowledge and attention, the elites will be tightly constrained in
the types of changes they can hope to introduce. If the theory of
rational ignorance is sound, however, then elites free of prior
constitutional restraints can impose changes in policy they wish to
achieve, even if those changes are only weakly related to the desires
of the public or to the crisis that brought on the period of constitutional change in the first place. Instead of controlling the process of
constitutional change, voters merely open the door for elites to
impose those changes they themselves desire.

84. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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Obviously, the precise means of testing this latter prediction will
depend on the details of the particular case. The same stricture
applies to the determination of who counts as a member of the
"political elite." It is clear, nonetheless, that we have two theories
of the relationship between voters and constitutional change that
make opposing, and to a great extent mutually exclusive, predictions. The opposing predictions make it easier to test the two
theories against each other and obtain usable results, since
evidence that helps to confirm one theory necessarily helps refute
the other."
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE NEW DEAL ERA
To test the opposing theories of constitutional change, this Article
focuses on what is by far the most important period of constitutional
change in twentieth-century American history: the New Deal. The
New Deal is one of the paradigm events that led to the development
of both Ackerman's theory8 7 and the theory of realignment.88 It is
also the one period ofindisputable large-scale constitutional change
that has occurred in the United States subsequent to the beginning
of modern opinion polling. It is therefore a self-evidently crucial
case.
Although the New Deal era saw many social and political
changes, the key constitutional change, in the sense defined here,
was the massive extension of federal government power over the
economy."s Previously, federal economic regulatory power, though
slowly growing, was severely limited.' Afterwards, it was greatly
extended and, for the most part, limited only by such restraints as

86. See STEPHEN VAN EVERA, GUIDE TO METHODS FOR STUDENTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
83(1997).
87. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 99-104; ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
2, supa note 14, at 279-311 (analyzing the New Deal as a constitutional moment).
88. See BURNHAM, supra note 36, at 1, 8; SUNDQUIST, supra note 36, at 198-239.
89. For a recent survey, see DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 363-80 (1999).
90. See, e.g., WLLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213-16 (1995) (describing tight

restraints on the federal government's economic power prior to the 1930s); BERNARD H.
SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LiBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 110-55 (1980); Epstein, supra note 26,
at 1399-1408.
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Congress and the President were themselves willing to accept. 91
Although this dramatic shift did not result in changes to the text of
the Constitution, it did result in a massive change in its interpretation by the courts. Legal scholars of all political persuasions see this
as a virtual revolution in constitutional doctrine.9 2
New Deal constitutional change provides us with several ways to
test the competing theories outlined above, including tests of the
models' predictions for voter behavior and their predictions for
elites. To test the former, I analyze survey data from the time
period in question to determine the level of voter knowledge.
Because such evidence is extremely limited, however, I also
examine later National Election Study data to determine whether
respondents of voting age during the New Deal era had greater
knowledge of key issues than those who came of age later. To
analyze the views of elites, I examine their strategies on three
issues directly relevant to constitutional change in the New Deal
era: the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and President Franklin Roosevelt's
plan to "pack" the Supreme Court to ensure that body would uphold
his constitutional innovations.
Research into the impact of voter ignorance might explain an
important anomaly in New Deal historiography. As a recent leading
91. For summaries of the growth of federal government economic power, see, for example,
HIGGS, supra note 13, at 172-80; KENNEDY, supra note 89, at 363-80; Epstein, supra note 26,
at 1443-54; John Joseph Wallis, Why 1933? The Originsand Timing of NationalGovernment
Growth, 1933-1940, in EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (Robert Higgs ed.,

1985). A minority of scholars argue that the New Deal truly made no fundamental changes,
since its policies actually were rooted in those of the Hoover Administration. For the most
sophisticated presentation of this view, see Michael S. Lewis-Beck & Peverill Squire, The
Transformationofthe American State: The New Era-New Deal Test, 53 J. POL. 106,107 (1991)
(noting the "rather remarkable policy continuity" between Hoover and the New Deal era). Yet
even these writers concede the general point that fundamental constitutional change resulted

from the crisis brought on by the Great Depression, merely locating its beginnings one
administration earlier. See id. at 118. Moreover, even if Hoover and the Republicans
originated many of the specific New Deal measures, there is little question that the federal

government's new role did not become institutionalized on a permanent basis until the New
Deal. During the New Deal, the Supreme Court endorsed the federal government's new role.
See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 90, at 213-36. Hoover and his administration generally

saw their new policies merely as temporary emergency measures that could soon be repealed.
See HIGGS, supra note 13, at 162-67.
92. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2, supra note 14, at 279-382 (describing the
Court's post-New Deal jurisprudence as "revolutionary"); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 90, at
213-36; see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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history of the New Deal, one generally sympathetic to the Roosevelt
Administration and its policies, finds, most of the New Deal had
little, if any, connection to the goal of alleviating the Depression.'
The pattern of New Deal policies cannot be easily understood
merely as a response to public concerns about the Depression."
Many of the key policies seemingly had little relevance to ending
the economic downturn, and some may even have exacerbated it.'
A second important anomaly of New Deal policy change is that some
key policies were implemented and continued in the face of strong
public opposition. For example, New Deal pro-union labor policies
were instituted despite strong public distaste for labor unions and
strikes revealed in contemporary survey data.'
These patterns are difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to
account for under the heightened attention hypothesis. They
become more understandable in light of rational ignorance theory.
If the latter is correct, then many New Deal economic policies may
have been a result of political leaders pursuing policy changes that
they or organized interest groups, rather than electoral majorities,
favored. While the general public may have disliked labor unions,
union members and leaders surely supported New Deal policies
favorable to their interests. Political leaders may have been willing
to pursue pro-union policies because they understood that voter
ignorance would limit the force of public backlash.
A number of scholars examining government growth in the 1930s
argue that political leaders exploit crisis situations, including

93. KENNEDY, supra note 89, at 363-64 (showing that many New Deal measures were
unrelated to the goal of ending the Depression and noting New Deal's *conspicuous failure to
produce economic recovery").
94. Of course, such policies are even less understandable if we accept a monetarist rather
than a Keynesian interpretation of the Depression's causes. For the seminal work advancing
monetarist interpretation theory, see MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A
MONETARY HISTORy OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 299-419 (1963).
95. For a recent detailed statement of the argument that FDR's policies actually made the
Depression more severe than it otherwise would have been, see Jim POWELL, FDR's FOLLY:

How ROOSEVELT AND His NEW DEAL PROLONGED THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2003). Although a
popular account, Powell's book provides extensive citations to academic literature supporting
his argument.
96. Strikes and the labor unions that organized them were viewed unfavorably by a

majority of respondents in nearly all surveys on the subject from 1935 to 1941. See infra notes
220-32 and accompanying text.
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periods of constitutional change, to expand their powers." What
these writers do not explain is why voters allow political leaders to
expand their powers beyond what is necessary to deal with the
crisis at hand, sometimes even in ways that do not address the
crisis at all. Voter ignorance may be a crucial part of the story
because measures taken for other reasons can be packaged to illinformed voters as crisis management strategies.
IV. SURVEY EVIDENCE OF VOTER KNOWLEDGE DURING THE NEW
DEAL ERA

The New Deal era is the first period in American political history
for which we have extensive polling data from Gallup, Roper, and,
occasionally, other organizations.98 These surveys include questions
on voter knowledge for the 1935-1941 period, which is of most
direct concern here. 9 Unfortunately, the surveys contain only a few
questions of this type. Overall, they show that there was a relatively low absolute level of voter knowledge during the New Deal
era, at least on the issues addressed in the questions. What they
do not give us, unfortunately, is a basis of comparison with other
periods. Retrospective analysis of voter knowledge through National
Election Study survey data, however, can fulfill this need.
A. New Deal-EraSurvey Data
My research has uncovered only a few relevant voter knowledge
survey questions from the New Deal era. There are some questions
regarding voter attitudes towards constitutional change, however,
that shed light on the issue of elite constraint.

97. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

98. For a catalog of many of the Gallup polls, see GEORGE H. GALLUP, 1 THE GALLUP POLL:
PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971 (1972) [hereinafter GALLUP]. For Roper and other surveys, see
PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1946 (Hadley Cantril ed., 1951) [hereinafter PUBLIC OPINION]. The
results of all known Roper, Gallup, and other polls from this era have been cataloged online
by the Roper Center for Public Opinion. See Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, at
http:/web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/form/academicsroper.htm-l (last visited Nov. 7, 2003)
[hereinafter Roper Center].
99. Afte? 1941, of course, the onset of World War II largely brought the New Deal era of
constitutional change to an end. See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM 175-200 (1995).
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1. New Deal-EraSurvey Questions on Voter Knowledge
In this section, I briefly analyze four New Deal-era voter
knowledge surveys. Unfortunately, the evidence they provide is far
from definitive.
One of the more revealing and straightforward knowledge
questions was a 1940 survey in which respondents were asked to
define a "conservative in politics." Only 40% of respondents were
able to give an answer considered correct by interviewers.' It is
difficult to compare this survey directly with later attempts to
measure the public's ideological awareness because the survey
interviewers were apparently told to use their own judgment in
determining what counts as a "correct" answer. The results seem
broadly similar to those of leading studies in the 1960s and 1970s,
however, which generally found 15% to 30% of respondents
conversant with the liberal-conservative dichotomy, usually under
standards of evaluation tougher than those of the 1940 survey,
including requiring respondents to connect these concepts to specific
issues. 01 It is also significant that the absolute number of those
able to define liberalism and conservatism correctly was relatively
low, despite the fact that the survey was taken after eight years of
highly publicized confrontations between liberals and conservatives
over fundamental ideological disagreements brought on by the New
Deal. If the era of New Deal constitutional change had led to greatly
increased ideological awareness, it is difficult to find support for
this proposition in the 1940 Gallup survey.
In another Gallup survey, this time in 1945, only 41% of respondents could correctly define the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA),
one of the most prominent and controversial of the New Dealcreated government agencies.0 2 In this case, the number of
respondents able to identify the TVA probably had been inflated by
a then-current proposal to create a similar agency for the Missouri
River area.' °3 Forty-one percent is not an especially high rate, and

100. PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 98, at 584.

101. See NEUMAN, supra note 78, at 20-21 (1986).
102. PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 98, at 698, question 25.
103. See id questions 26, 29, 30.
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one in line with later results from survey questions of similar
difficulty administered during "normal" periods.'
A 1939 Gallup question revealed a more complex survey result
when it asked respondents to rate a number of important political
leaders as conservative, liberal, or radical. Unfortunately, this
survey also exemplifies some of the difficulties of using survey data
from this period.

104. See DELLI CARPIN & KELEE,

supra note 8, at 105-34.

2003]
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Table 1
1939 Gallup Survey on Ideological Alignment of Leading
Political Figures1 5
Leader

%

Liberal

Radical

3

40

30

1

61

7

No

%

Opinion

"Correct"

27

40(L)

36

2

61(L)

54

24

15

54(L)

11

55

21

12

55(L)

35

37

6

22

72(if C-L)

40

36

2

22

36(L)

56

28

3

13

28(if L)

37

16

2

45

37(C)

54
84

8
5

1
3

37
8

54(C)
84(C)

Conservative

Harry
Hopkins

President
Roosevelt
Fiorello
LaGuardia

James
Farley

Thomas

35(if C)

Dewey

Cordell
Hull

John
Garner

Arthur

84(if C-L)

Vandenberg

Robert Taft
Herbert
Hoover

The figures in the survey were all highly prominent political
leaders. Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Ohio Senator
Robert Taft, and New York Governor Thomas Dewey were all
potential Republican presidential contenders for the 1940 election;
the former two were highly conservative, while Dewey was arguably
more of a moderate, though still to the right of the Roosevelt

Administration. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Postmaster
General James Farley were prominent liberal cabinet members and
105. Data is adapted from GALLUP, supra note 98, at 164. The survey question asked: "How
do you classify each of the following (on card) political leaders-as a conservative, a liberal,

or a radical?" Id For a very similar August 1938 Roper survey, see Roper Center, supra note
97, Accession Nos. 0175908-0157913.
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possible presidential contenders should President Franklin D.
Roosevelt have declined to run for a third term.1" Although Vice
President Garner-another possible presidential candidate-by
1939 had clashed publicly with FDR because of his distaste for
many New Deal measures, he was surely not nearly as conservative
as most Republicans.
Overall, the survey data in Table 1 is hard to interpret because
of two complex issues: whether it is acceptable to regard President
Roosevelt and other mainline Democrats as radical as well as
liberal, and whether it is acceptable to categorize Republican and
Democratic moderates (i.e., Dewey and Garner) as both liberal and
conservative. If we permit all these possible variations to count as
correct, then the survey would indicate a strikingly high rate of
voter knowledge, at least with respect to the more prominent
figures. If we take a narrower view of correct political labeling, the
majority of respondents were unable to place correctly Dewey, Hull,
Vandenberg, Taft, and Farley, all of whom were highly prominent
politicians and, with the exception of Dewey, had been heavily
involved in conflicts over the New Deal.
In sum, the few available knowledge questions from the New
Deal era suggest a level of political knowledge similar to that later
observed in periods of normal politics. Unfortunately, the small
number of questions available prevents us from making any
definitive conclusions. Only in conjunction with other evidence
presented here do these findings gain significance.
2. New Deal-EraSurvey Evidence on Constraint
Several New Deal-era survey questions directly asked respondents whether they supported constitutional change of the sort
established by the Roosevelt Administration and its allies. These
questions do not measure voter knowledge, but they are relevant
to the issue of elite constraint. If political leaders adopted constitutional change despite the fact that the majority of the public was
opposed to such change, voters may have lacked sufficient knowl-

106. In the 1930s and earlier, the position of Postmaster General was much more
important than it is today, and generally was held by a prominent politician.
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edge to impose their preferences on this issue. 107 From 1936 to 1937,
Gallup conducted three surveys asking respondents whether they
supported a constitutional amendment to give Congress expanded
power to regulate industry and agriculture, the fundamental
question at issue in New Deal constitutional change. In a January
1936 survey, Gallup asked: "Would you favor an amendment to the
Constitution transferring to the Federal Government the power
° Forty-three percent of
to regulate agriculture and industry?"O
respondents answered "yes," while a strong majority (57%) said
"no."1°' In a similar question asked in December 1936, Gallup
asked: "Would you favor an amendment to the Constitution giving
Congress the power to regulate agriculture, commerce, industry,
and labor?" ° Once again, a majority (5 1%) said "no," while 42%
answered "yes" and 7% expressed no opinion.'
These two surveys are significant in that both were conducted in
the year of the 1936 election, which Ackerman views as the time of
major popular endorsement of constitutional change creating
largely unlimited congressional power to regulate the economy.' 12
The December survey was taken only a few weeks after Roosevelt's
landslide election victory. Despite this fortuitous-from Ackerman's
standpoint-timing, the surveys strongly suggest that a majority of
voters actually opposed the constitutional change that the Roosevelt
Administration sought to adopt.
The data presented here is obviously not definitive. The surveys
do not measure the intensity with which voters held their opinions
on this issue. Some of those who said "no" might simply have been
expressing a general aversion to tinkering with the Constitution,
rather than an opposition to the specific change sought by the
New Dealers. Others might have favored granting the federal
government the power to regulate industry, but not agriculture or
107. I am indebted to the analysis of these same survey questions by Barry Cushman. See
Cushman, supra note 2, at 3741. Cushman recognizes the significance of these surveys to
interpreting public opinion on New Deal constitutional change, but he does not specifically
link them to the issue of elite constraint.
108. GALLUP, supra note 98, at 12; Roper Center, supra note 98, Accession No. 0173555.
109. GALLUP, supra note 98, at 12; Roper Center, supra note 98, Accession No. 0173555.
Apparently this poll did not provide respondents with a "no opinion" option.
110. Roper Center, supra note 98, Accession No. 0279185.
111. See id
112. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2, supra note 14, at 309-11.
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vice versa. Unfortunately, the survey questions did not give
respondents the option of endorsing federal regulatory power over
one area but not another. 113
The survey evidence shows, nonetheless, that a majority of the
public may well have been opposed to the main constitutional
change imposed by the New Deal, and that political leaders were
not sufficiently constrained by this majority view to desist from
their efforts to establish plenary federal power over economic
regulation. The Roosevelt Administration apparently understood
that a majority of the public was opposed to broad constitutional
change, as evidenced by their decision to avoid mention of constitutional change almost entirely during the 1936 campaign.""
This conclusion is reinforced to some degree by the third and final
Gallup survey question regarding support for a constitutional
amendment to give Congress broad regulatory power over the
economy. In March 1937, Gallup asked: "Would you favor an
amendment to the Constitution giving Congress greater power to
regulate industry and agriculture?" 1 This question differed from
the previous two in that it posited a potentially much more modest
increase in federal regulatory power. Instead of asking whether
respondents would favor giving Congress "the power to regulate"
industry and agriculture,1 1 which implies complete power over
these subjects, this question merely asks respondents whether they
would favor granting Congress17regulatory power "greater"than that
which it currently possesses.
Not surprisingly, this more modest grant of power was supported
by a much higher percentage of respondents. Fifty-eight percent of
respondents in the March 1937 survey said that they favored the
proposed amendment, while 42% said that they were opposed. 1
As Barry Cushman points out, however, it is significant that 42%
113. This problem is exacerbated in the December 1936 question, which listed four
different areas of regulation: agriculture, commerce, industry, and labor. See supra note 110
and accompanying text.
114. William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election
of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE LJ.2077, 2079-88 (1999).
115. GALLUP, supra note 98, at 53-54; Roper Center, supra note 98, Accession No. 0173578.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 110.
117. See supra text accompanying note 115.
118. See GALLUP, supra note 98, at 53-54; Roper Center, supra note 98, Accession No.
0173578.
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may have opposed any substantial increase in federal regulatory
authority at all.1 19 This suggests that much of the opposition to
increased federal power expressed in the two 1936 surveys was
quite deeply rooted. It also bears noting that the actual constitutional change imposed by the New Deal went far beyond a mere
increase in congressional regulatory power, and in fact made that
power virtually plenary.' °
Although the survey evidence analyzed above shows that a
majority of voters might have been opposed to giving the federal
government broad, unconstrained regulatory power, other surveys
show that strong majorities favored more limited constitutional
change that allowed for certain specific types of economic regulation without establishing plenary federal regulatory authority. In
particular, the vast majority of respondents in a series of Gallup
and other surveys conducted from 1936 to 1938 favored constitutional amendments granting Congress the power to regulate and
prohibit child labor and to set minimum wages." Support for a
constitutional amendment granting Congress the power to "limit,
regulate, and prohibit" child labor ranged from 61% to 76% in four
identically worded Gallup surveys taken between April 1936 and
February 1937.122 A June 1936 survey showed that 70% of respondents supported "an amendment to the Constitution to regulate
minimum wages."" Of those supporting the amendment, however,
only 56% (39% of the total sample) favored giving this power to the
federal government, while 44% preferred to give it to the states.'2
The child labor and minimum wage surveys are significant in
showing broad public support for limited constitutional change.
Paradoxically, they also lend additional credence to the claim that
most of the public was opposed to giving the federal government
broad, unlimited regulatory powers. Clearly, most of the public was
not averse to altering the Constitution per se; otherwise, the strong
majorities in favor of the child labor and minimum wage amendments would be difficult to explain. It therefore seems likely,
though not certain, that most of those who expressed opposition to
119. Cushman, supra note 2, at 38-39 (noting that "[elven at the height of the constitutional
crisis, 42% of those with opinions apparently opposed any increase in federal regulatory
power over industry and agriculture").
120. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 90, at 220-36.
121. The survey data on these two issues is described in more detail by Barry Cushman.
See Cushman, supra note 2, at 39-41.
122. See GALLUP, supra note 98, at 23-24, 50; Roper Center, supra note 98, Accession Nos.
0173642, 0278912,0279242,0173558.
123. GALLUP, supra note 98, at 29.
124. Id.

628

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:595

constitutional change giving Congress broad regulatory power
really were opposed to that particular change itself and were not
simply suspicious of changing the Constitution in general.
The survey data on voter attitudes towards constitutional change
in the 1930s provide some evidence that political leaders were not
as much constrained by public opinion on constitutional change as
Ackerman's theory suggests. 2 ' Although they do not provide
definitive proof that the degree of constraint present in the 1930s
was no higher than that in periods of normal politics, there is some
indirect indication. The question of whether the constitutional order
should be altered to give Congress plenary regulatory power over
the economy is one of almost immeasurable importance. If political
elites could go against majority opinion on such a fundamental and
far-reaching question, it is hard to conceive of a situation, whether
in normal politics or otherwise, where they would be substantially
less constrained than this. We cannot rule out the possibility that
political constraint increased modestly during the New Deal, but
that the level of constraint was just not great enough to force
political leaders to respect majority public opinion on constitutional
change. We can, moreover, have greater confidence in rejecting the
view that there was a truly massive increase in constraint that
enabled public opinion to wrest control of the constitutional change
process from political leaders and interest groups.
B. Retrospective Evaluationsof Trends in Voter Knowledge
1. The 1952 NES Data
Although I have been unable so far to locate adequate individuallevel survey data on New Deal-era voter knowledge, I have
developed a methodology for using later National Election Study
(NES) surveys to partly offset this gap in the available evidence.
The 1952 and 1960 NES surveys both contain voter knowledge
questions directly relevant to prominent New Deal issues.' I
conjecture that if the heightened attention hypothesis is correct,
voters who lived through the New Deal era should, controlling for
other relevant variables, have higher knowledge levels in the 1952
125. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
126. The data from the 1952, 1960, and other NES surveys are available from the
University of Michigan's Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR). See ICPSR Front Page, at http/Avww.icpsr.umich.edu (last visited Nov. 7, 2003). I
have recoded the data for the 1952 and 1960 NES surveys in order to make it tractable for
purposes of the present research. See infra Appendices A, B. The recoded data set is on file

with the author and available upon request.
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and 1960 surveys than their younger counterparts. Alternatively,
it may be that such an effect would appear only in the case of
respondents who came of age during the New Deal period. These
respondents would be part of the cohort of new voters that political
scientist Kristi Andersen argues were the main agents of realignment to the Democratic Party during the New Deal."?
In effect, the NES data allow us to compare two different
potential "learning experiences" that might increase political
knowledge: periods of constitutional change and periods of normal
politics. If the Ackerman hypothesis is correct, we should expect
that those who had the benefit of both experiences should have
learned at least somewhat more New Deal-relevant political
knowledge than those who only had the opportunity to learn from
normal politics. If living through the New Deal era of constitutional
change does not increase one's chances of learning even very basic
knowledge, the rational ignorance hypothesis becomes much more
compelling than its rival.
I have tested both the "of age" and cohort hypotheses using
evidence from the 1952 and 1960 NES surveys. This Article
presents only the 1952 evidence, which is greatly superior in quality
to the 1960 survey for my purposes."S However, the 1960 results do
support my conclusion and are therefore included in Appendix B.
Using data from the 1952 NES survey, I have been able to specify
both the standard Ackerman model and the Andersen cohort
alternative. The dependent variable is the respondent's cumulative
score on seven New Deal-related knowledge items.
A brief review of the content of the seven items and the reasons
for including them is helpful.' The first question asks whether the
Democratic Party or the Republican Party supports a large role for
the federal government in various areas of social welfare policy.
This question obviously relates to the fundamental partisan issue
127. See KRLs ANDERSEN, THE CREATION OFADEMOCRATIc MAJORITY, 1928-1936, at 39-72
(1979). For another influential account of cohort theory that emphasizes the importance of
"formative" experiences early in a voter's adult life as permanent shapers of political
orientation, see AlRHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 29-31
(1986).
128. The 1952 survey is superior for three major reasons: First, it was closer in time to the

actual New Deal. Second, it had seven New Deal-relevant knowledge questions, while the
1960 survey had only five. Third, and most important, the 1960 NES survey is missing a great
deal more data than the 1952 NES survey, which leads to much greater skepticism regarding
the validity of the data. In the 1952 NES survey, 1141 of 1634 respondents had complete data
for all the variables relevant to the study. In the 1960 NES survey, this was true of only 150
to 600 (depending on how many variables were included) out of 1181 respondents. I have,
therefore, chosen to focus my analysis on the more reliable 1952 NES survey, especially since
the 1960 results support the same conclusions.
129. The complete text of all relevant knowledge questions used is recorded in Appendix A.
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raised by the New Deal and the most important divergence between
the two major political parties at the time. The remaining six
questions asked respondents to identify the likely partisan leanings
in the upcoming 1952 election of six groups critical to the New Deal
political realignment: members of the working class, union members, "big business," blacks, Catholics, and Jews. With the exception
of "big business," all of these groups became staunch supporters of
the Democrats during the New Deal era, as a result, historians
believe, of President Roosevelt's support of an economically activist
federal government."0 By contrast, "big business" generally
supported the Republican Party, both during the New Deal and
later . ' Thus, an individual even moderately well-informed about
the New Deal and the resulting alignment of political forces created
by it should have been able to answer these seven questions
correctly with comparative ease. The questions, therefore, constitute a useful test of basic New Deal-related political knowledge.

130. See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supranote 127, at 9-10; SUNDQUIST, supru note 36, at 214-23. The
majority of Catholics had been Democrats even before the 1930s, but it is generally believed
that the New Deal strengthened their Democratic leanings, and in any event scholars agree
that northern Catholic voters were a key component of the New Deal coalition. See, e.g.,
SUNDQUISr, supra note 36, at 215-16.
131. Cf SUNDQUISr, supranote 36, at 224-26 (explaining the Republican countermovement
of non-New Deal supporters).
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Table 2
Political Knowledge in the 1952 NES Survey
"Of Age" During the New Deal Model
Variable
Unstandardized Std. Standardized T-Stat Significance
Beta
Error Beta
Name
.122
.240
_1.547
(Constant) .372
5.031 .000
TV
.295
.059 .151
.908 .364
5.644E-02
.062 .026
Radio
3.464 .001
.076 .116
Newspaper .264
.411
.681
.074
.013
Magazines 3.034E-02
.427 .670
.095
.012
Civic Duty 4.049E-02
2.180 .029
.242
.091
Race (black=l).527
-2.478 .013
.092 F.066
Sex (female=1 -.229
4.317 .000
.067
.137
Interest in .291
Campaigns
(3 pt. scale)
3.395 .001
.031
.111
Family Income .105
I
(8 pt. scale)
-3.564 .000
.128
-.110
Region
-.456
(South=l)
-2.243 .025
.335 -.100
Southern -.751
Black (yes=l)
.060 .102
3.584 .000
Political Acts .214
Beyond Voting
(5 pt. scale)
.015
.560 .576
7.024E-02
.125
Of Age
During New
Deal (yes=i)
.134
.893
.036 .005
Education 4.878E-03
III
I
(7 pt. scale)
Dependent Variable: New Deal-Relevant Knowledge. n=1141 r 2=.247
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Table 3
"Of Age" During the New Deal Model with
Education/Media Usage Interaction Variable
Variable
Name
(Constant)

Civic Duty
Race (black=1)
Sex (female=1)
Interest in
Campaigns

Unstandardized Std. Standardized
Beta
Error Beta
1.298

.217

5.879E-02
.582
-.248
.375

.096
.244
.093
.066

-Stat Significance
5.970

.000

.017
.101
..071
.177

.614
2.388
-2.663
5.712

.539
.017
.008
.000

.142

4.406

.000

(3 pt. scale)

Family Income .134

.030

(8 pt. scale)

Region

I

-.617

.125

-.149

4.938 .000

Southern Black -.925

.335

-.124

2.757 .006

.061

.111

3.832

.054

-.071

-1.381 .167

.126

.023

.834

404

087

.149

2.800

.005

(South=1)
(yes=1)

I

Political Acts .233
Beyond Voting

.000

(5 pt. scale)

Education

-7.491E-02

(7 pt. scale)

Of AgeDuring 105
New Deal
(yes=l)

Education, 243
Media Usage
Interaction

Dependent Variable: New Deal-Relevant Knowledge.

n=1141

r 2=.227
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Table 4
Political Knowledge in the 1952 NES Survey
New Deal Cohort Model
Unstandardized Std.
Error
Beta
.224
(Constant) .425
.059
TV
.312
6.859E-02
.062
Radio
.076
Newspaper .270
.074
Magazines 1.976E-02
095
Civic Duty 4.074E-02
.242
Race (black=l).490
.092
Sex (female=1) -.235
.068
Interest in .297
Campaigns
Variable
Name

Standardized T-Stat Significance
Beta
1.897 .058
5.278 .000
.160
.032
1.097 .273
.118
3.538 .000
.267
.790
.008
.428
.669
.012
.085
2.028 .043
-2.546 .011
-.068
4.386 .000
.140

(3 pt. scale)

.031

.101

3.055

-.446

.129

-.108

-3.465 .001

-.736

.335

-.098

-2.193 .028

.060

.101

3.566

.000

1.084E-03

.036

.001

.030

.976

4.226E-02

.107

.011

.396

.692

Family Income 0.09

.002

(8 pt. scale)

Region
(South=1)

Southern
Black
(yes =1)

Political Acts .214
Beyond Voting
(5 pt. scale)

Education
(7 pt. scale)

New Deal
Cohort
(yes =I)

Dependent Variable: New Deal-Relevant Political Knowledge. n=1141
r 2=.247
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Table 5
New Deal Cohort Model with Education/Media Usage
Interaction Variable
Variable
Name
(Constant)
Civic Duty
Race (black=l)
Sex (female=l)
Interest in
Campaigns
(3 pt. scale)
Family Income
(8 pt. scale)
Region
(South=l)
Southern Black
(yes=1)
Political Acts
Beyond Voting
(5 pt. scale)
Education
(7 pt. scale)
New Deal
Cohort
(yesi)
Education,
Media Usage

-Stat Significance

Unstandardized
Beta
1.437
6.172E-02
.548
-.252
.381

Std.
Error
.189
.096
.244
.093
.066

Standardized
Beta
.018
.095
-.073
.180

7.603
.642
.248
-2.705
5.770

.125

.031

.133

4.104

-.617

.126

.149

.000
I
-. 905 .000

-.918

.337

-.123

-2.727 .006

.230

.061

.109

3.757

-9.237E-02

.054

.088

1.717 .086

5.243E-02

.108

.013

486

627

.266

.087

.164

3.064

002

.000
.521
.025
.007
.000

.000

Interaction
Dependent Variable: New Deal-Relevant Knowledge.

n=1128

r2=.225
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Table 6
New Deal-Relevant Knowledge
1952 NES Survey Respondents
Frequency Distribution
No. of Correct Frequency
Answers
0
254
1
218
2
300
3
338
4
305
152
5
6
54
7
13
Total
1634

ercent
15.5
13.3
18.4
0.7
18.7
.3
.3
.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
15.5
28.9
47.2
7.9
6.6
5.9
9.2
100.0

Furthermore, different types of political knowledge are highly
intercorrelated. 3 2 Thus, even if these particular seven questions
have little significance in themselves, they also serve as proxies for
other types of political knowledge. A respondent able to answer
these items correctly also would be more likely to possess other
political knowledge than one who could not.
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, I have specified
two models: the standard heightened attention model and a model
based on the Andersen cohort theory. In both cases, the cumulative
number of correct answers to the seven questions is the dependent
variable.
The first specification included every respondent who had turned
eighteen by 1940, the last year in which a national election
primarily focused on New Deal-related issues, while the second
counted all respondents who had turned eighteen between 1933 and
1940. l13 I also have introduced gender, race, region, income,
education, interest in politics, participation in politics beyond
voting,3 4 and use of media such as radio, television, newspapers,
and magazines as control variables.' In both models, having lived
132. See, e.g., DELLI CARPMI & KEETER, supra note 8, at 139-51.
133. Switching the minimum age to twenty-one, which at the time was the minimum voting
age in most states, does not affect the results in any statistically significant way. I have
chosen to analyze the data based on an eighteen-year-old voting age because most children
of the New Deal era had assumed adult responsibilities by this age.
134. Participation "beyond" voting is simply any political activity that the respondent has
engaged in other than the act of voting. Examples include volunteering for a campaign or
making a financial contribution to a candidate. In the regressions used here, this variable is
coded from zero to five depending on the total number of acts reported by the respondent.
135. These media variables are widely accepted as important determinants of political
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through the New Deal (or, alternatively, coming of age during that
period) had no statistically significant impact on respondents'
knowledge. For ease of exposition, a graphic representation of these
results is provided in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1
Predicted New Deal-Relevant Knowledge Level for
Average Respondent in 1952 NES Survey: "Of Age" During
the New Deal Model
7.00,
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•
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,
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0

2.00

1.00
W

z

0.00
Not of Age During New Deal

Of Age During New Deal

Age During New Deal Era

Independent variables: education, family income, civic duty, race, gender, interest in
campaigns, region, political acts beyond voting, education-media usage interaction variable.
m
Continuous independent variables set at their mean; dichotomous variables set at mode.
Dependent variable measured by number of correct answers on seven-point scale.
2
n=1141; r =.227

Figure 1 demonstrates that a 1952 NES respondent who was not
an adult during the New Deal era and was average in terms of
knowledge in the literature. For detailed discussion, see, for example, DEw CARPINI &
KEETER, supra note 8, at 209-10.
136. It should be noted that the modes for the dichotomous variables were as follows:
Race: white
Sex: female
Region: non-southern
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income, education, race, media usage, and other relevant independent variables had virtually the same level of New Deal-relevant
political knowledge
as a similar respondent who was of adult age in
7
the 1930s.1

Figure 2
Predicted New Deal-Relevant Knowledge Level for
Average Respondent in 1952 NES Survey:
New Deal Cohort Model
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Independent variables: education, family income, civic duty, race, gender, interest in
campaigns, region, political acts beyond voting, education-media usage interaction variable.
Continuous independent variables set at their mean; dichotomous variables (other than
cohort) set at mode.'"
Dependent variable measured by number of correct answers on seven-point scale.
n=1128; r2=.225
137. The exact predicted number of correct answers for an average respondent who was of
age during the New Deal was 3.28 out of 7. The predicted number for an otherwise identical
respondent who was not of age during that time was 3.18 out of 7. The difference between
these two figures is not statistically significant and thus does not represent any confirmation
of the heightened attention hypothesis.
138. The modes for the dichotomous variables are, of course, exactly the same as those for
Figure 1. See supra note 136.
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Figure 2 shows that the same holds true for the New Deal cohort
model. A statistically average respondent who was not a member of
the New Deal cohort had the same
level of New Deal-relevant
13 9
political knowledge as one who was.
These results are striking for several reasons. First, I have
deliberately biased the model in favor of the heightened attention
hypothesis by not including age as a control variable for fear that
it might dilute some of the effects of the New Deal variable, because
age itself has been shown to be an independent cause of increased
political knowledge." Second, the questions all relate to very basic
political knowledge closely linked to New Deal political conflicts.
This should maximize the likelihood of detecting any New Dealrelated increases in knowledge that might exist.
To ensure that the results are not the product of factors peculiar
to any one specific knowledge question, I ran logistic regressions
using each of the seven knowledge questions as an isolated
dependent variable in its own right. 4 1 All fourteen regressions

(seven for the "of age" model and seven for the cohort model) failed
to show statistical significance for the "of age" and New Deal cohort
variables respectively." 2 The conclusion that the New Deal
experience did not lead to any substantial increase in voter
knowledge is therefore highly robust.
Confidence in the validity of the results is also strengthened by
the control variables all having generally the expected impact.
Interest in politics and higher incomes thus correlate with greatly
increased political knowledge. By contrast, women and African
Americans had considerably lower political knowledge levels than
white men, a result consistent with research on more recent data
sets."4 Obviously, these gender and racial differences in political
139. The exact numbers in this case are 3.40 predicted correct answers out of 7 for a
member of the cohort and 3.35 for a nonmember. As with the "of age" model, the difference
between the two figures is not statistically significant.
140. See DELLi CARPINi & KEETER, supra note 8, at 180-85 (noting that age has "at least
modest correlations with what people know about politics"). Including age as an additional
control variable, not shown here, did not affect the outcome.
141. I used logistic regression ("logit") because the dependent variables in these models are
dichotomous. Using logit or probit (a similar methodology) is the standard econometric
procedure in such cases.
142. I have not reported the results of these fourteen regressions in detail for reasons of
space. I would be happy to provide the results to interested readers, however.
143. In the present analysis I have created a separate variable for southern blacks on the
hypothesis that in the 1950s Jim Crow education and social mores decreased political
knowledge among southern blacks. This hypothesis turns out to be correct, but it has the
interesting consequence of creating a result in which northern blacks (the remaining members
of the "black" category in the survey) are shown to have slightly greater political knowledge
than northern whites. Too much significance should not be attached to this latter result, as
there were only thirty-eight northern blacks in the sample.
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knowledge were almost certainly due to a combination of discrimination and other social factors rather than to intrinsic differences
in ability to comprehend basic political information.1" Political
activity beyond voting and media usage also considerably increase
knowledge.
The one control variable with an unexpected result is education,
whose effect upon political knowledge seems to be statistically
insignificant. Education, however, does have a significant effect as
an interactive variable with media usage, as shown in Tables 3 and
5. I tentatively conjecture that this results from the fact that
following politics through the media, especially recently introduced
media such as television, was a more elite activity in 1952 than it
is today, so that the media usage variables absorb much of the
impact of education when the two are included together. An
additional factor may be that, given the much more limited
availability of information in 1952 than in today's more extensive
and diverse media environment, leveraging one's education for the
purpose of acquiring political knowledge required considerably more
active effort to follow politics through the media than was the case
in later periods.
2. PotentialObjections
a. The Problem of "Forgetting"
There are several possible objections to the conclusions reached
based on the 1952 NES survey. First, and most obvious, the 1952
NES survey was conducted twelve years after the last New Deallinked national election and seven years after the death of Franklin
D. Roosevelt. It is theoretically possible that those respondents
who increased their political knowledge during the New Deal had
forgotten what they had learned by 1952.
This consideration, however, probably does not invalidate the
results. First, in order for the objection to be sound, nearly all the
respondents who had increased their political knowledge during the
New Deal would have had to forget. 45 This scarcely seems plausible. Second, the knowledge in question was very basic and related
to matters that continued to be the focus of political controversy in
144. For more data and analysis on group differences in political knowledge, see Somin,
supra note 10.
145. Or, more technically, enough respondents would have had to forget in order to ensure
that the remainder was small enough to prevent a statistically significant result. With a large

sample of over 1100 respondents, however, even a relatively small percentage of learners who
had retained the information would have led to a statistically significant coefficient for the
variable.
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the post-World War II period.'" Thus, anyone who had learned this
information in the 1930s would have continued to find it useful in
interpreting postwar politics, a circumstance that would limit the
tendency to forget.
Finally, two studies suggest that forgetting over time is not as
serious a problem as we might imagine. In a study of party
affiliation during the New Deal, Kristi Andersen found that the
percentage of respondents surveyed in 1968 and 1972 who recalled
being affiliated with the Democratic Party or Republican Party in
the late 1930s is almost exactly identical to percentages reported in
surveys undertaken in 1937.17 Although recalling one's own party
affiliation may be easier than recalling specific political information
related to external events, a countervailing factor is that Andersen's
respondents were interviewed more than thirty years after the fact,
though the 1952 NES survey was conducted only twelve years after
the close of the New Deal era. A more recent study by M. Kent
Jennings finds that the vast majority of respondents who knew a
given political fact in 1965 still remembered it in 1982, seventeen
years later.'" The rates of successful retention on the five knowledge items tested in Jennings' study ranged from 54% to 97%, with
an average retention rate of 76%.49 If Jennings' findings are
reasonably close to an accurate representation of political knowledge retention more generally, there is every reason to believe that
a substantial proportion of those who picked up additional political
knowledge during the New Deal era would retain it for a long time
to come. Notably, only twelve years passed between the last New
Deal election and 1952, as compared to seventeen years in Jennings'
study. Additionally, the items in the 1952 NES survey were more
useful to understanding contemporary politics than most of those
tested by Jennings."
b. The Possibilityof "CatchingUp"
One could also make the opposite criticism of my theory from that
of the "forgetting" hypothesis: instead of the New Deal generation
"forgetting," it is conceivable that later generations "caught up"
with the New Deal veterans over time. This is not impossible; but,
146. See infra Appendix A.
147. ANDERSEN, supra note 126, at 59-60.
148. M. Kent Jennings, PoliticalKnowledge Over Time and Across Generations, 60 PUB.
OPINION Q. 228, 243-45 (1996).
149. The five items in question had retention rates of 54%, 60%, 82%, 85%, and 97% after
seventeen years. See id. at 244, tbl.2.

150. Several of the items tested by Jennings were purely historical information or other
knowledge not directly relevant to contemporary politics. See Jennings, supra note 148.
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if true, it serves to refute rather than support the heightened
attention hypothesis. It implies that during periods of ordinary
politics, such as the 1945-1952 period, voters learn no less than
during periods of constitutional change. Furthermore, if Ackerman
and those who advance related theories are correct, we should at
least expect those voters who had the benefit of two opportunities
to learn (the New Deal era and the postwar period) to acquire
more knowledge on average than those who had just one (only the
postwar period).
A related potential objection is concern over the fact that the six
knowledge questions regarding the political alignment of various
groups asked respondents to predict their alignments in the thenupcoming 1952 election rather than during the New Deal era itself.
However, the five pro-Democratic groups referenced in the
question-African Americans, the working class, union members,
Jews, and Catholics-disproportionately supported the Democrats
throughout the post-New Deal era, including in 1952. The one proRepublican group, "big business," certainly gave the bulk of its
support to the Republicans throughout this period, 1952 included.
The key point to remember is that the political alignments of all six
groups were created during the New Deal era,' 5 ' and that paying
attention to the events of that era would provide a respondent with
knowledge that enabled him or her to predict accurately those
groups' later allegiances, which had not changed significantly as of
1952. A second relevant consideration is that the purpose of the
1952 evidence is not primarily to analyze absolute knowledge levels
but to determine the relativeknowledge impact of the New Deal era.
On this score, there can be little doubt that the acquisition of even
a basic understanding of the events of the New Deal would have
helped a respondent to predict accurately political alignments in
1952.
c. Effects Hidden in Residuals
Although the "of age" and New Deal cohort variables failed to
achieve statistical significance in a wide range of different specifications of the model, defenders of the heightened attention hypothesis
could try to salvage the theory by arguing that the effects of these
variables are hidden in the residuals. This line of argument would
151. A partial exception were the Catholics, a majority of whom supported the Democrats

even before the New Deal. Catholic voters, however, were a crucial part of the New Deal
coalition and their support for the Democratic Party increased during the New Deal era. For
these reasons, I have decided to include the question about Catholics in the analysis.
Excluding it does not significantly affect the regression results.
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be unpersuasive for two major reasons. First and foremost, the
residuals in question are extremely small, consisting of approximately 0.1 correct answers on the seven-point knowledge scale.1"2
Even if we assume that the full value of the residuals combined
with the full value of the statistically insignificant coefficient in
reality represents a true knowledge-increasing effect of the New
Deal era, it would still constitute an increase of only about onetenth to one-seventh of a correct answer on the seven-point scale.
By contrast, moving from the lowest to the highest level on the
three-point interest in political campaigns scale increases a
respondent's knowledge level by almost four-fifths of a correct
answer-a very large difference; moving from the lowest to the
highest income group (on an eight-point scale) increases knowledge
by close to a full point on the seven-point knowledge scale."s Such
a tiny effect, even if it were statistically significant, would fall far
short of the vast increase in knowledge predicted by Ackerman and
other heightened attention advocates. At most, it would indicate
that the New Deal led to a tiny increase in political knowledge that
still left the vast bulk of the population shockingly ignorant of what
we would consider to be very basic knowledge.
The second reason that the argument from residuals should be
rejected is that allowing the heightened attention hypothesis to
take credit for residuals would be poor methodology. In virtually all
social science data, there will be some margin of error and therefore
a residual greater than zero. If a theory asserting the importance of
a given variable is considered valid unless disproven by a statistical
showing of insignificance that has a standard error of zero, hardly
any theory could ever be rejected. Such an approach is especially
defective in cases like the present one, where the claimed effect is
asserted to be large.
d. SeparatingVoters and Nonvoters
To make my findings more complete, it would be useful to be able
to separate voters from nonvoters in order to tell if the conclusion
of no increase in knowledge holds true for those who actually voted
in New Deal-era elections. Unfortunately, assessing political
knowledge among voters as a discrete group is difficult or impossible because numerous survey respondents who do not vote routinely
tell pollsters that they did.' Those citizens most likely to report
152. See supra Tables 2-5.
153. See supra Tables 2-5.

154. This is a longstanding and well-established finding in social science research. See, e.g.,
Robert P. Abelson et al., Attempts to Improve the Accuracy of Self-Reports of Voting, in
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voting inaccurately are those with the highest levels of income,
education, and interest in politics-that is, the same people who are
most likely to have high levels of political knowledge.155 Any
attempt, therefore, to disaggregate the 1952 NES data, or other
similar survey results, by self-reported voting rates would lead to
very large overestimations of the relative knowledge of voters; most
of the more knowledgeable nonvoters would be falsely coded as
having voted.'56
Attempts to separate voters from nonvoters in our case are
further complicated by the fact that we seek to find people who
voted in past elections rather than the current one. We cannot,
thus, place much credence in the 1952 NES questions on selfreported voting in the 1952 election itself. The 1952 NES does
contain, however, a survey question which to some degree addresses
the issue ofvoting in past presidential elections. The question asked
respondents: "In the elections for president since you have been old
enough to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them,
most of them, some of them, or none of them?"15 7
In order to test whether living through the New Deal era or being
a member of the New Deal cohort had an impact on the political
knowledge of self-reported voters, I reran both the "of age" and New
Deal cohort models using only those respondents who claimed to
have voted in at least "some" past presidential elections. With this
specification, the New Deal cohort variable continued to produce
statistically insignificant results."
In contrast, the "of age" model produced results that at first
glance provide support for the heightened attention hypothesis.
When we limit the data set to only those respondents who claimed
to have voted in at least some past presidential elections, there is
a statistically significant increase in New Deal-relevant knowledge
of a full point on the seven point scale (1.06 points in all).159

QUESTIONS ABOUT QUESTIONS 138, 138 (Judith M. Tanur ed., 1992); Aage R. Clausen,
Response Validity: Vote Report, 32 PUB. OPINION Q. 588 (1968). One recent study notes that
"overreporting of voting behavior" is "[olne of the most frequently observed survey
measurement errors." Robert F. Belli et al., Reducing Vote Overreportingin Surveys: Social
Desirability,Memory Failure,and Source Monitoring, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 90, 90 (1999).
155. See Brian D. Silver et al., Who Overreports Voting?, 80 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 613,613-14,

620-22 (1986) (finding that these factors are all strongly correlated with overreporting of
voting).
156. Studies show that about 25% to 30%of all nonvoters claim that they voted on surveys.
1d. at 613.
157. ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER 1952 AMEicAN NATIONAL
ELECTION STUDY 43 (rev. ICPR ed. 1975).
158. Exact regression results are on file with the author.
159. Complete results for this regression are on file with the author.
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Unfortunately, this result may be due entirely not to the
significance of voting itsalf, but to the correlation between lying
about past voting and variables highly correlated with political
knowledge."6 Support for this explanation is provided by the fact
that there is no statistically significant New Deal-related spike in
knowledge among those who claimed that they voted in "all" or
"most" past presidential elections.161 The statistically significant
effect seems to be confined to those who said they voted in "some"
past presidential elections. Table 7 summarizes these results in a
more accessible form:

160. See supranotes 154-56 and accompanying text.
161. Exact regression results are on file with the author.
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Table 7:
Statistical Significance of Being of Age During the New
Deal Among Self-Reported Voters
Statistically Significant

Increase in New Deal
Relevant

Frequency of Self.
Reported Voting in
Past Presidential
Elections

Knowledge Among
Those "Of Age" During
New Deal Era
Claimed to have
voted in "All"past
elections, "Most,"

Yes

or "Some"

"All" or "Most"

No

only

"Some" only

Yes

The fact that the knowledge-increasing impact of the New Deal
seems confined to those self-reported nonvoters who claimed to have
voted in only "some" past presidential elections suggests that the
underlying dynamic at work is lying about having voted rather than
voting itself. Those highly knowledgeable nonvoters who falsely
claimed to have voted in the past presumably would be more likely
to lie by saying that they had voted in only "some" past presidential
elections rather than making the more extreme deception of falsely
claiming to have voted in "most" or "all" past elections. The
concentration of false positives in the "some" category seems to be
the only available explanation for the fact that the knowledgeincreasing effects of the New Deal are concentrated in this small
subset rather than ranging equally over all those who reported
voting in past elections. Those respondents who claimed to have
voted in only "some" past presidential elections constituted just 179
of the 1134 respondents for whom the 1952 NES survey had
complete data. 62 Yet the positive knowledge impact on them of
living through the New Deal was so strong as to create a statistically significant impact among all those who claimed to have voted
in the past when the data for all three possible responses to the past
voting question are mixed together.
The best conclusion that can be drawn from my attempt to
separate voters from nonvoters is that being of age during the New
162. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 157, at 43-44.
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Deal caused a substantial increase in political knowledge among a
small subset of highly knowledgeable marginal voters (those who
truthfully claimed to have voted in only "some" past presidential
elections) and among those nonvoters most likely to lie about
having voted. It seems to have had no effect, however, on knowledge
levels among the vast majority of both voters and nonvoters who do
not fall in these categories.
e. Are the NES Knowledge Questions Too Basic?
A final possible objection to my methodology is that the knowledge tapped by the questions is too basic. Perhaps constitutional
change only increases more sophisticated types of political knowledge. Moreover, the basic knowledge identified in the NES survey
may be of the type that most people acquire even in ordinary times.
Yet more than two-thirds (67.9%) of the 1952 NES survey respondents knew the correct answers to only three or fewer of the seven
questions.1" Because basic political knowledge is fundamental to
the understanding of more complex knowledge,16' and the two are
highly correlated,"~ one would expect the incidence of basic
knowledge to increase greatly during a period of constitutional
change if the heightened attention hypothesis is sound.
The present analysis is the first direct analysis of 1950s voter
knowledge of any kind. Previous studies of trends in political
knowledge that incorporated the 1950s and early 1960s used
indirect measures of "sophistication" rather than knowledge, and
ignored those NES survey questions which tapped knowledge
directly."6 The approach proposed here provides us with both a new
way of considering the impact of the New Deal on voter knowledge
and a possible model for other voter knowledge research focused on
this period.
Overall, the NES data is an important supplement to the very
limited evidence available from contemporary 1930s surveys.
Unlike the latter, it has individual-level data and allows us to
compare the political knowledge of the New Deal generation to that
of its successors on the same survey items. This evidence strongly
suggests that there was no significant increase in voter knowledge
as a result of the constitutional upheavals of the New Deal.
163. See supraTable 6.
164. See DELiA CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 8, at 63-65.
165. See id. at 138-47.
166. For notable studies that followed this methodology, see CAMPBELL ETAL., supra note
78; NEUMAN, supra note 78; NORMAN H. NIE ET AL., THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1976);
SMITH, supra note 29.
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V. POLITICAL ELITES, VOTER KNOWLEDGE, AND NEW DEAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THREE CASE STUDIES

In contrast with the relative scarcity of studies of New Deal voter
behavior, there is a vast literature on New Deal-era political
elites.1 7 What these studies have not focused on, however, is the
elites' view of the electorate, and their perceptions of how voters
constrained their policy options. This is what I propose to do here,
specifically in the area of federal economic policy.
Although the concept of "political elites" is not easily defined, for
present purposes I would like to focus on leading figures in the
Roosevelt Administration and Congress during the New Deal era.
These officials had the strongest incentives to gauge the electorate
accurately since their own chances of reelection depended on it, and
they also had the greatest control over constitutional change.
Obviously, a truly complete analysis also should include interest
group leaders, state-level politicians, and others. National political
leaders, however, are the most appropriate focus for a study that
must necessarily be limited in scope.
A. Case Selection Criteria
To analyze elite perceptions of voter knowledge and ignorance, I
examined three key policies integrally linked to New Deal constitutional change: the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and President Roosevelt's
plan to "pack" the Supreme Court. In selecting these three cases, I
have been guided by several criteria. First, the cases were directly
connected to constitutional change in important and relatively
obvious ways. They posed direct and fundamental challenges to the
preexisting constitutional order. If such were not the case, they
would not be a fair test of the heightened attention hypothesis.
Second, the policies chosen had a broad effect. An otherwise minor
policy that challenged the existing constitutional system is, of
course, more likely to have been ignored by voters, and so poses a
weaker test of the theory. Moreover, a minor policy's very insignificance makes it a less serious challenge to the constitutional system
167. See, for example, BRINIaUEY, supra note 99; ALAN BRINXLEY, LIBERALISM AND ITS
DISCONTENS (1998); LEUCHTENBURG, supranote 90; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE
OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL (2d prtg. 1959) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER,
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL]; ARTHUR M. SCHLSINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT. THE
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL (1960), for a small sampling of these studies, which are far too
numerous to list. See KENNEDY, supra note 89, for the most thorough recent account.
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than that posed by a policy with more wide-ranging effects. Finally,
I chose only policies relevant to the constitutional powers of the
federal government, even though New Deal constitutional change
also expanded the economic powers of the states. This criterion was
introduced for two reasons. First, the heightened attention hypothesis is primarily a theory about national-level constitutional change
because the federal government is much more powerful and visible
than that of the states. Second, federal government policies are
generally more uniform in their impact than those of states, since
state policies obviously vary, which is a factor that would complicate
research. Because of these considerations, the heightened attention
hypothesis and its alternatives are more readily tested in the
federal setting.
To obtain needed evidence on elite perceptions of the public from
the three cases, several questions must be answered.
(1)

Did the elites see the policy as one that would come under
unusually tight scrutiny from the general public, as the
heightened attention hypothesis would predict? Or did
they, by contrast,perceive the New Deal crisis as a period
when they were under substantially looser than normal
constraints from public opinion, as predicted by the
rationalignorance theory?

This, of course, is the key point of contention between the
heightened attention hypothesis and opposing theories. We know
that New Deal-era politicians, though lacking the full panoply of
modern public opinion polling techniques, closely followed public
opinion in other ways, and began to make use of survey research.'"
We also know that the Roosevelt Administration was perhaps the
most politically successful in American history. 6 9 Its leaders'
perceptions on these questions are important, in and of themselves,
as an indicator of the dynamics of constitutional change, and also
provide an additional window on public attitudes.
(2) If so, did the elites perceive this scrutiny to be a result of
the policy's constitutionalimplications?
In theory, close public scrutiny may have been merely the result
of the policy's immediate, narrowly defined impact, even if voters
missed its broader, long-term constitutional significance. If political
168. See SUsAN HERBn, NuMBERED VOICES: HOW OPINION POLLING HAS SHAPED AMERICAN
PoLrTICs 89-92 (1993).

169. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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elites made a distinction between these two considerations and saw
one as more important than the other, it would have important
implications for the Ackerman view that constitutional change is
special in its dynamics.
(3) Did elites believe that they could engage in major deceptions of the public as to the policy's true nature and import,
especially its constitutionaldimensions?
Obviously, an elite view that the public is vulnerable to deception
is a strong indicator that elites do not consider the public to be well
informed. It is important, however, to define narrowly "deception."
Obviously, some shading or oversimplification of the truth is
inherent in nearly all political rhetoric. The kind of deception that
is significant here is a conscious and systematic attempt to
misrepresent a policy in a major way.
(4) Since actions speak louder than words, to what extent did
the elites tailor theirpolicy decisions and politicalstrategies as a result of their answers to questions 1 and 2?
The fact that elites actually acted on their perceptions is, of
course, a strong indicator of the elites' confidence in their correctness.
B. The NationalIndustrialRecovery Act
As the centerpiece of Roosevelt's first term economic policy, the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) T° was arguably the most
ambitious effort at governmental economic planning in American
history."' Enacted in early 1933, the NIRA provided for control of
prices and production by industry councils acting as cartels backed
by the federal government.172 The Act further required affected
firms to abide by minimum wage and maximum hours regulations
that varied by industry.173 It also enacted a large-scale program of
public works."' All told, the NIRA covered "almost the entire

170. National Industrial Recovery Act, Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
171. See DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTiATION 92 (1988).
172. For a detailed description of the NIRA's provisions, see id. at 33-80; MICHAEL M.
WEINSTEIN, RECOVERY AND REDISTRIBUTION UNDER THE NIRA 1-31 (1980).
173. BRAND, supra note 171, at 11.
174. See § 201-07, 48 Stat. at 200-05.
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private, nonagricultural economy. " "' This policy was radically at
odds with existing constitutional doctrine, which strictly limited the
economic powers of the federal government to the regulation of
"interstate commerce," narrowly defined to include only the actual
movement and exchange of goods across state lines. 7 6 In 1935, the
Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional in a unanimous
decision, A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.7 7
Nonetheless, the NIRA served as a model for later, more narrowly
based New Deal policies,"7 ' and the Supreme Court eventually
conceded federal government regulatory powers of roughly the same
breadth as those unsuccessfully claimed by the administration in
the Schechter case. 7 9
In addition to its importance as an element of New Deal constitutional change, the NIRA has considerable intrinsic interest as a
massive public policy disaster. Its attempts at centrally planned
price controls and production limits apparently caused a massive
six to eleven percent decline in the United States' real Gross
National Product (GNP) in an already deeply depressed economy." s
The NIRA's labor regulations, while successful in increasing wages
substantially, also caused a large decline in employment centered
on poor and unskilled workers.' The interesting point here is that
the NIRA was at least partially successful in benefitting the
organized interest groups-large corporations and labor unions-that were its strongest advocates, while simultaneously
inflicting extensive harm on the bulk of the population, exactly the
opposite of what the Ackerman hypothesis of heightened voter
control would lead one to expect.
Thus the NIRA was the New Deal's first and broadest challenge
to the existing constitutional system of political economy. It was
also a large-scale policy change with sweeping effects on almost the
entire U.S. economy. It therefore qualifies as an appropriate case
study for this project. Bruce Ackerman has himself acknowledged
the importance of the NIRA as a test for his theory, referring to it
175. WEINSTEIN, supra note 172, at 1.

176. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 90, at 214-16; Epstein, supra note 26, at 1399-1408.
177. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
178. See, e.g., ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 187-204
(1995) (noting that the failure of the NIRA opened the door for passage of the Wagner Act);

KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 209-11 (1991).
179. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (endorsing expansive federal
regulatory power over economic matters); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 90, at 213-36
(describing post-1937 Supreme Court decisions that gave Congress almost unlimited power

to regulate the economy).
180. WEINSTEIN, supra note 172, at 146.

181. 1d&at 146-47.
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as a far-reaching attempt "to abolish market capitalism and replace
it with a corporatist structure" and as "the most important initiative of the first New Deal Congress." i 2
Three aspects of the NIRA are particularly relevant to our
purposes here: political constraint, deception, and the impact of
constitutional problems.
1. Political Constraint
As nearly all studies of the NIRA point out, both big business and
labor union leaders saw the early Depression period as an opportunity to implement cartelization schemes for product prices and labor
markets.' Although it is perhaps not surprising that labor
unionists saw the period as a political opportunity and did not
expect to be hampered by public opinion, I"" it is more surprising
that business leaders saw it in the same way, given their apparent
unpopularity and President Roosevelt's numerous public denunciations of them as "economic royalists.""s
Nonetheless, most students of the NIRA portray it as an attempt
by business leaders, particularly those in large enterprises, to
cartelize the economy for their own benefit."s More radical historians even argue that the NIRA was an attempt to strengthen the
capitalist class as a whole and quiesce radical sentiments in the
labor movement and the general population. 8 7 Even the one major
dissenting analysis of the NIRA attributes it to an "autonomous"
state acting to implement "progressive" ideologies of planning
rather than to respond to pressure from voters.1s8 These studies
seem to argue against the heightened attention hypothesis and in
favor of the alternative theory that voter ignorance increases the
discretion of political leaders and interest groups.
182. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2, supra note 14, at 286, 288.
183. See, e.g., BERNARD BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THE NRA 4 (1975); BRAND, supra note

171, at 105-16 ; HAWLEY, supra note 178 at 26-31; ROBERT F. HIMMELBEG, THE ORIGINS OF
THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 196-205 (2d ed. 1993); SCHLESINGER, COMING OF

THE NEW DEAL, supra note 167, at 87-102; Ronald Radosh, The Myth of the New Deal, in A
NEW HISTORY OF LEVIATHAN 146, 159-64 (Ronald Radosh & Murray N. Rothbard eds., 1972).

184. Although, as noted below, survey evidence shows unions and strikes to have been
generally unpopular in the 1930s. See infra text accompanying notes 220-32.

185. See James Gray Pope, The ThirteenthAmendment Versus the CommerceClause:Labor
and the ShapingofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, 1921-1937,102 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 72 (2002).
186. See, e.g., BELLUSH, supra note 183, at 4; HAWLEY, supra note 178, at 26-34;

HIMMELBERG, supra note 183, at 195-210; Theda Skocpol & Kenneth Finegold, State Capacity
and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal, 97 POL. Sci. Q. 255 (1982).
187. Barton J. Bernstein, The New Deal: The ConservativeAchievements ofLiberalReform,
in TOWARDS A NEW PAST. DIssENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 263, 263-65 (Barton J.

Bernstein ed., 1968); Radosh, supra note 183, at 146-47.
188. BRAND, supra note 171, at 105-16.
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2. The Impact of Constitutionality
There is little if any evidence that Administration officials or
interest group leaders were much concerned about public reaction
to the likely constitutional implications of the NIRA. They did of
course fear-with justification, as it turned out-that the NIRA
would be invalidated by the Supreme Court.I"9 There is no evidence,
at least in sources examined so far, that they worried about the
reaction of voters on this matter, as the Ackerman hypothesis would
predict.
3. Deception
The Roosevelt Administration's strategy for gaining public
support for the NIRA apparently involved a substantial element of
deception. As virtually all scholars agree, the NIRA was intended
to be a permanent restructuring of the American economy along
corporatist lines."9 Supporters of the NIRA among business interest
groups and many American liberals hoped that the NIRA would
rebuild the American economy on the model of Mussolini's fascist
Italy, then widely regarded as a successful alternative to laissezfaire capitalism by both corporate and liberal leaders.1 9 ' National
Recovery Administration (NRA) Director Hugh Johnson privately
told Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins that, "[w]hen this crisis is
over and we have the recovery program started, there won't be any
need for a Department of Labor or a Department of Commerce"
because their functions would be subsumed by the NRA. 1"
Nonetheless, administration public statements and public relations campaigns trumpeted it as a temporary emergency measure
to end the Depression. 9 ' The theme of the massive publicity
campaign headed by Johnson himself emphasized that the NIRA

189. See WLLA.M E. LEuCHTENBuRG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 31-32
(1963).
190. See BRAND, supra note 171, at 105-16; BRIMKLEY, supra note 99, at 21-47; HAWLEY,
supra note 178, at 26-34; HIDMELBERG, supra note 183, at 200-05; Radosh, supra note 183,
at 146-47; Skocpol & Finegold, supra note 186, at 195-210.
191. See Radosh, supranote 183, at 162 (pointing out that "itlo liberals, fascism appeared
to be a system of planning that transcended classes and led to an equilibrium of contending
social forces"). See generally John P. Diggins, FlirtationWith Fascism:American Pragmatic
Liberalsand Mussolini'sItaly, 71 AM. HIST. REV. 487 (1966).
192. FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 240 (1946).
193. See Roger I. Roots, Government By PermanentEmergency: The Forgotten History of
the New Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFoLK U. L. REV. 259, 259 (2000).
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was a crisis measure similar to those taken in war."9 New Dealers
portrayed the NIRA as the "moral equivalent of war." 9 '
Private sector interest groups that lobbied in favor of the NIRA
also stressed the need to portray it as an emergency measure
intended to alleviate the Depression. James Emery, general counsel
of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the leading
business group supporting the NIRA, wrote in May 1933 that the
NIRA must be "worked out as an emergency proposal" even though
its ultimate objective was "self-government within industry" (a
reference to cartel control of production through the NIRA codes)."9
Over time, pro-NIRA business groups "learned to stress ... the

public-benefits, recovery-oriented nature of their proposals." 97
It is possible that President Roosevelt did not even accept the
claim that the NIRA could help achieve recovery, and only came to
support the policy as a result of interest group pressure. Even one
of the NIRA's supporters expressed discomfort in urging the
President to accept the cartelization of business because of what he
considered to be the President's support for "the workings of free
competition."' 98 Obviously, FDR did not believe the NIRA would
become as great a disaster as it actually was; nonetheless, his
skepticism about its likely effects is noteworthy.
After resisting proposals for legislation to facilitate cartelization
for several months, President Roosevelt changed his position and
threw his support behind the NIRA after extensive lobbying by
business interests led by the NAM.' The Administration allowed
a NAM-led business "advisory committee" to pre-screen the final
version of the bill, which was submitted to Congress only after the
business leaders were satisfied that the legislation met their
needs."oo The final "text of the [NIRA], except for Section 7(a),
conceded to the business concepts on every important point."2° ' The
194. See generally HIGGS, supra note 13, at 177-80; William E. Leuchtenburg, The New
Deal and the Analogue of War, in CHANGE AND CONTINuITf IN TWENTITH-CENTuRY AMERICA
81 (John Braeman et al. eds., 1964). The campaign included extensive use of slogans and
symbolism, such as the famous "NRA Eagles," and included the largest demonstration in U.S.

history up to that time. See HIGGS, supra note 13, at 179; SCHLESINGER, COMING OF THE NEW
DEAL, supra note 167, at 79.
195. BRAND, supranote 171, at 94.
196. HIMMELBERG, supra note 183, at 204 (quoting letter from James A. Emery to A.W.
Berresford (May 2, 1933)).

197. Id. at 205.
198. Id. at 189 (quoting letter from John S. Lawrence to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar.
1933)). John S. Lawrence was the leader of a regional business association and a college
classmate and personal friend of Roosevelt. See id.

199. Id. at 201-06.
200. Id. at 206-07.
201. Id. at 207. Section 7(a) was the provision of the NIRA protecting the organization of
labor unions. See id at 207. Congress included it at the behest of labor union leaders,
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President's willingness to accept the business interests' proposal for
a massive cartelization of the American economy despite his own
apparent skepticism about its utility is striking. Such domination
of the legislative process by interest groups seems inconsistent with
the proposition that political leaders believed that the broader
voting public was highly knowledgeable and attentive.
Initially, the NIRA was scheduled to expire in two years, subject
to renewal by Congress, 2 which the Administration and its allies
fully expected to achieve.20" This suggests, perhaps, that Administration officials did fear an adverse public reaction to long-term
constitutional change. But if so, it also shows that they saw voters
as sufficiently ignorant to be deceived by invocations of temporary
"emergency" measures.
It is significant that the failure to extend the NIRA in 1935
resulted not from any upsurge of public opposition but from a
combination of bureaucratic inefficiency 2° and irreconcilable
conflicting demands of interest groups.2 5 It is likewise appropriate
to point out that the NIRA did not suffer any significant public
backlash from the large decline in GNP and increase in unemployment it caused. 2" Overall, the NIRA experience is a dramatic
example of the elites' attempts to exploit voter ignorance to gain
their own ends in the context of a constitutional moment. Both
administration officials and labor and business leaders calculated
-in considerable part correctly-that the existence of a constitutional crisis increased their discretion rather than decreased it.
C. The National LaborRelationsAct
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), °7 despite
important later modifications, forms the foundation of American
particularly American Federation of Labor (AFL) head William Green. See id. at 206-07.
202. See HAWLEY, supra note 178, at 31.

203. The initial NIRA passed overwhelmingly, and the Administration had a large
Democratic majority in Congress, supplemented by support from liberal Republicans. See id.
at 30 (noting that the NIRA was approved by a vote of 325 to 76 in the House of
Representatives and 58 to 24 in the Senate).
204. See Skocpol & Finegold, supra note 186, at 257, 264-68.
205. For descriptions of these conflicts, see, for example, BELLUSH, supra note 183, at 5584; HAWLEY, supra note 178, at 119-27; SCHLESINGER, COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, supranote
167, at 118-22, 144-46.
206. For details of the economic damage caused by the NIRA, see WEINSTEIN, supra note
172, at 146-47.
207. See Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151169 (2000)). The NLRA is also sometimes known as the Wagner Act, after its principal
sponsor, Democratic Senator Robert F. Wagner. See WILLIAM H. SPENcER, THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT: ITS SCOPE, PURPOSES, AND IMPUCATIONS 1 (1935).
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labor law to this day. Briefly summarized, the NLRA requires
employers to recognize employee unions, to bargain with them in
"good faith," and to refrain from engaging in "unfair" labor practices. 2" It further sets out a framework in which a union gains
recognition through a majority vote of workers at a given enterprise, and creates a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to
adjudicate labor-management disputes under the Act.'
With respect to our case selection criteria, the NLRA was
obviously a major policy change with broad, long-term effects. It
also had clear constitutional implications. From the beginning,
Administration officials and NLRB z0 leaders were intensely
concerned about the danger that the NLRA would be overturned by
the Supreme Court.21 ' In the end, the Supreme Court narrowly
upheld the NLRA in a 5-4 decision in 1937.212 This case, NLRB v.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., was a key component of the famous
"switch in time that saved nine" that eventually consummated the
New Deal constitutional revolution.213
For the purposes of this Article, the following aspects of the
NLRA deserve analysis.
1. Constraint
Some analysts of the NLRA's origins attribute its passage, at
least in part, to 1934 electoral victories by liberal Democratic
members of Congress.21 If this analysis is correct, the NLRA's
passage was not due to any great popularity of unions among the
general public. One of the biggest surprises that came to light in the
preliminary research for this Article was the consistent unpopularin public opinion surveys throughout the
ity of unions and strikes
215
middle and late 1930s.

208. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (2000).
209. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTE BARGAINING POLICY 129-30 (1950),
for more thorough and detailed summaries of the NLRA; SPENCER, supra note 207. Bernstein
provides the standard liberal defense of the Act. See BERNSTEIN, supra, at 132-48. For a
conservative-libertarian critique, see Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for LaborRelations:
A Critiqueof the New Deal LaborLegislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983). For critiques from the
left, see RutH OBRIEN, WoRR' PARADOX THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF NEW DEAL LABOR
POLICY, 1886-1935 (1998); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985).
210. The NLRA established the NLRB. See JAMESA. GROSS, THE MAKINGOFTHE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1974).
211. See id. at 149-88.
212. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
213. Cf LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 90, at 213-36.

214. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol et al., Explaining New Deal Labor Policy, 84 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 1297, 1300 (1990).
215. See infra notes 220-32 and accompanying text.
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As in the case of the NIRA,216 union leaders and their supporters
clearly saw the Depression as an opportunity to install policies they
had long favored, but were unable to implement under the preexisting constitutional framework.2 17 They perceived looser rather than
tighter constraints on their political agenda. What is not clear from
previous research is their view of constraints by public opinion. We
do know that New Deal-era congressional and executive branch
officials kept close track of public opinion, 21 even though direct use
of survey results was just beginning to become commonplace.219
What is striking is the fact that the NLRA prevailed-and indeed
became a central element of the emerging New Deal order-despite
strong public skepticism about the virtues of unions and strikes.
Gallup and Roper surveys from 1935 to 1939 found that large
majorities opposed prominent strikes at Ford and General Motors,
and sit-down strikes generally, and even supported employers who
refused to negotiate with strikers.22 ° In a 1937 survey, 57%favored
calling out the militia "whenever strike trouble threatens."22 '
Perhaps even more tellingly, an April 1937 Gallup poll found that
65% of respondents endorsed the use of "force" by "state and local
authorities ... in removing sit-down strikers." 2 2 Survey respondents

also expressed generally negative sentiments concerning Congress
of Industrial Organizations (CIO)leader John L. Lewis, the most
prominent of the more radical labor leaders.223 In a 1937 survey a
strong plurality of 45% of respondents stated that the New Deal had
been "too friendly toward labor" while only 13% believed that it was
"not friendly enough." 224 An important point to note is that the
question concerned "friendliness" towards "labor"-a term which
has generally positive connotations-rather than towards unions
per se. Had the survey instead used the word "unions," it is likely
that responses would have been even more one-sided. Survey
respondents did express strong support for the very existence of
labor unions in questions where this issue was not coupled with
references to any special legal rights for unions, such as those
enshrined in the Wagner Act,

2

and also favored union-backed

216. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
218. See HERBST, supra note 168, at 89-112.

219. Id.
220. See GALLUP, supra note 98, at 48, 52-53, 85; PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 98, at 873.
221. GALLUP, supra note 98, at 63.
222. Id at 55; Roper Center, supranote 98, Accession No. 0278891.

223. GALLUP, supra note 98, at 31, 48.
224. Id at 69.

225. Id at 31, 67.
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measures banning child labor,226 and establishing a minimum
wage.227 These were not the issues at stake in the NLRA, however,
which was concerned with collective bargaining and strikes. 2 s
Other examples of survey results indicating hostility to unions
and strikes include 1937 and 1939 Gallup surveys indicating that
some two-thirds of respondents supported the enactment of laws
making "sit-down strikes" illegal. 2 ' Two 1937 surveys found that
71% of respondents opposed permitting striking workers to receive
payments from government relief funds.' 0 In one instance, 70% of
respondents gave this answer even though the question was limited
to "workers who go on strike and have no money of their own." "
Numerous surveys indicated hostility to particular highly publicized
strikes. 2
Although it is possible that these survey results were tainted by
underrepresentation of lower class respondents, both the Gallup
and Roper organizations made extensive efforts to cut down on such
methodological flaws.233 Unlike the notorious 1936 Literary Digest
poll which mistakenly predicted a crushing Republican victory in
the 1936 presidential election, 4 Gallup and Roper were fairly
successful in predicting electoral outcomes during this period.235
The survey results analyzed above cast interesting light on the
theory that the NLRA was the result of popular discontent resulting
from the large wave of union-led strikes in 1934 and 1935.' Given
the extreme unpopularity of strikes and those unions that organized
them, it seems likely that Roosevelt Administration and congressional leaders would have gained equal or greater popularity by siding
with employers, and that their policies were intended either to
placate unions as a narrow, organized interest group or as an
226. Id.at 101.
227. Id.
228. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
229. GALLUP, supra note 98, at 52-53, 143; Roper Center, supra note 98, Accession Nos.
0278932,0274170.
230. GALLUP, supra note 98, at 52-53, 143; Roper Center, supra note 98, Accession Nos.
0278932, 0274170.
231. Roper Center, supra note 98, Accession No. 0279014.
232. See, e.g., GALLUP, supra note 98, at 48, 85.
233. For an account of these efforts, see Cushman, supra note 2, at 77-101.
234. For brief descriptions of the famous flawed Literary Digest poll, see JEAN M.
CONVERSE, SURVEY RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES: RooTs AND EMERGENCE 1890-1960, at
116-21 (1987); Cushman, supra note 2, at 79-83.
235. For example, Gallup's polls predicted the 1936 outcome correctly, and he made further
improvements in methodology after the election was over. CONVERSE, supra note 234, at 11920.
236. This argument was first advanced by Michael Goldfield. See Michael Goldfield, Worker
Insurgency, Radical Organization,and New Deal Labor Legislation, 83 AM. POL. Scd. REV.
1257 (1989).
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expression of "autonomous state" policymaking." 7 In either case,
they could not easily be characterized as responsive to majoritarian
public opinion.
To the extent that political leaders calculated that voter ignorance and inattention would enable them to ignore majority public
opinion with respect to the NLRA, their reasoning is supported by
the limited direct evidence of public knowledge of the Wagner Act.
In a 1938 survey, taken after three years of ongoing public debates
over the NLRA and its implementation and revision, 50% of
respondents had "no opinion" as to whether the "Wagner Labor Act
is fair to employees," and 51%had no view as to whether it was fair
to employers.2" Such high "no opinion" responses suggest a very low
level of public attention to and knowledge of the issue, especially
when we consider that survey respondents often express opinions
even about issues they know nothing about to avoid seeming
ignorant.' For this latter reason, the true percentage of respondents who knew little or nothing about the NLRA might have been
considerably higher than fifty percent. 2'
2. Constitutionality
As in the case of the NIRA, there is little or no evidence in the
existing literature that Roosevelt Administration officials and their
allies worried about possible popular reaction to the constitutional
implications of the NLRA. Here, too, the literature has not focused
on this directly, and more analysis and research is needed. The
general outline of the evidence nonetheless seems to support the
rational ignorance hypothesis, while placing its rival in serious
doubt.

237. See generally Theda Skocpol, Political Response to CapitalistCrisis: Neo-Marxist
Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal, 10 PoL. & SocY 155 (1980) (discussing

"autonmous state" policymaking).

238. Roper Center, supranote 98, Accession Nos. 0279094, 0279095.

239. For the classic survey results showing that many respondents will express opinions
even about fictitious legislation, see Stanley Payne's famous finding that 70%of respondents
expressed opinions regarding the nonexistent "Metallic Metals Act." STANLEY L. PAYNE, THE
ART OF ASKING QUESTIONS 17-18 (1951).

240. Surveys that asked respondents whether they had "heard of the Wagner Labor Act"
elicited positive responses from well over 70%of respondents. See Roper Center, supra note
237, Accession Nos. 0277145,02774815. Itis impossible to know how many respondents really
knew about the legislation and how many merely said they did to avoid appearing ignorant.
False responses to avoid appearing ignorant are extremely common, as studies of fictitious

survey questions have demonstrated. See, e.g., PAYNE, supra note 239, at 17-18; Del I.
Hawkins & Kenneth A. Coney, Uninformed Response Error in Survey Research, 18 J.

MARKETING RES. 370,373 (1981) ("Nearly one-fourth of the entire sample offered an opinion
about a fictitious government agency!").
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D. The Battle Over Court Packing
President Roosevelt's 1937 plan to "pack" the Supreme Court by
expanding its size in response to adverse rulings on numerous New
Deal programs brought the issue of constitutional change to a head.
Although the plan itself was defeated in Congress, the political
pressure Roosevelt was able to bring to bear on the Supreme Court
eventually led the Court to back down from its opposition and
essentially accept the President's claim of nearly unlimited federal
government power over the economy.24 ' While some historians and
political scientists have traced the growth of federal government
power back before the Roosevelt Administration to Herbert Hoover's
New Era,242 the Court's decisions and the New Deal policies they
ratified
institutionalized and legitimized this growth for the long
24 3
term.

1. The Issue of Constitutionality
President Roosevelt and his advisers had been frustrated by the
Supreme Court's obstruction of New Deal policies for a long time
prior to 1937, particularly after the Court invalidated several
prominent New Deal policies, including the NIRA, from 1935 to
1936.244 The President and his advisers nonetheless deliberately
241. See David A. Pepper, Against Legalism:Rebutting an AnachronisticAccount of 1937,
82 MARQ. L. REV. 63, 146-52 (1998) (strongly reasserting the traditional view that the Court's
"switch" was due to external political pressure). For the strongest statement of the revisionist
view that purely legalistic concerns drove the Court's decisions, see BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKIG THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998).
242. See, e.g., JOAN HOFF WILSON, HERBERT HoovER: FORGOTTEN PROGRESSIVE 122-67
(1975); Lewis-Beck & Squire, supra note 91, at 108; Murray N. Rothbard, HerbertHoover and
the Myth of Laissez-Faire,in A NEW HISTORY OF LEVIATHAN, supra note 183, at 111, 111.
243. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2, supra note 14, at 359-77. As Ackerman notes, the
Hoover policies were still generally viewed as limited exceptions to a general rule of laissezfaire, and it was not a given that they would be extended and permanently institutionalized.
Id. at 281-82. The revisionist studies also have significant shortcomings in the way they
define and operationalize government growth. The most sophisticated revisionist study
defines government growth as growth in the number of government employees. See LewisBeck & Squire, supra note 91, at 116-19. This ignores the possibility, which in fact was true
of many New Deal policies, that similar numbers of employees could implement a broader
range of policies. Many New Deal policies were implemented by delegation to private entities
because of a lack of government bureaucratic capacity. See Skocpol & Finegold, supra note
186, at 263-68. An additional point is that Lewis-Beck and Squire focus exclusively on the size
of government without considering increases in its scope; yet increases in the latter were no
less characteristic of the New Deal and perhaps more so. See HIGGS, supra note 13, at 27-30
(emphasizing importance of scope as well as size to theories of government growth).
244. See, e.g., LEONARD BAKER, BACKTO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME
COURT 3-17 (2d prtg. 1968); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins ofFranklin D. Roosevelt's
'Court-Packing' Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 347, 349-50.
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decided to forgo even mentioning the Court or constitutional issues
more generally during the 1936 reelection campaign. 2 " This was
apparently a conscious political stratagem designed to avoid giving
a potentially strong issue to the Republican opposition. 2 " Although
the issue was of course raised by the Republicans, 7 it is clear that
the Roosevelt Administration calculated that its silence would steer
public attention away from the issue of constitutional change even
as it continued to try to implement such changes on a large scale. 2"
Even after President Roosevelt publicly put forward his courtpacking proposal in February 1937, the stated rationale was the
alleged inability of the elderly justices to handle their workload.249
Only after the plan neared defeat did the President, with little left
to lose, publicly state the real rationale: his desire to remove the
Court as an obstacle to New Deal policies.' The plan was ultimately defeated, but only after several decisions upheld challenged
New Deal programs and crafted new constitutional principles that
endorsed wide-ranging federal government power over the
economy.2 1
These actions by the Roosevelt Administration and its Republican
adversaries provide limited support for the Ackerman thesis. They
indicate that elites on both sides of the political divide perceived
constitutional change as an issue that would resonate with the
electorate, albeit in favor of the opponents rather than the supporters of change. At the same time, however, the Roosevelt Administration clearly calculated that the bulk of voters were ignorant
enough to ignore the issue or to believe that no real constitutional
change, was in the offing if administration spokesmen refrained
from mentioning it. Several of Ackerman's critics have fastened
onto the issue of the Administration's silence on constitutional
change. 2 FDR's opponents, of course, sought to raise the issue, but
they also focused primarily on other considerations, particularly the
threat to judicial independence. 2' This strategic gambit, like that
245. CUSHMAN, supra note 239, at 27; Michael J. Kiarman, Review Essay, Constitutional
Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional
Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 771 (1992); Leuchtenburg, supra note 114, at 2084;
Leuchtenburg, supra note 244, at 377-78.
246. Leuchtenburg, supra note 244, at 377-79.
247. Leuchtenburg, supra note 114, at 2088-96.
248. Id. at 2085-88.
249. See BAKER, supranote 244, at 8-9; LEUCHTENBURG, supranote 90, at 132-34; Stephan
0. Kline, Revisiting FDR's Court Packing Plan: Are the Current Attacks on Judicial
Independence So Bad?, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 863, 911-13 (1999).
250. See Kline, supra note 249, at 922-28.
251. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 90, at 213-36.
252. CUSHMAN, supra note 241, at 27; Kiarman, supra note 245, at 771.
253. See BAKER, supra note 244, at 28; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 90, at 139;
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of the Roosevelt Administration, sought to obscure the specific
constitutional disputes at issue by focusing on procedural matters
and by eliding the fact that the Administration's strategy was
meant to win a specific constitutional battle of great importance
rather than establish a general precedent for replacing Supreme
Court justices whenever an administration chose to do so. Previous
instances of court packing, primarily in the nineteenth century, had
not led to the collapse of judicial independence precisely because
they too had been limited to cases of dramatic constitutional
confrontation and had not been extended to more "normal"
periods.'
Here, even more so than in the NIRA and NLRA cases, voter
ignorance is a central issue, because the opposing elites' calculations focused directly on the question of whether or not voters were
knowledgeable and sophisticated enough to see through the
Roosevelt Administration's public rationales and understand that
constitutional change was the true underlying issue. Elites on both
sides had no doubt that it was. 5
2. Interactionswith Public Opinion
Unlike in the previous two cases, there is some systematic survey
evidence of public reaction to the court-packing plan, analyzed by
political scientist Gregory Caldeira.'r6 Caldeira used a set of
eighteen Gallup surveys of support and opposition to the courtpacking plan to determine whether events, such as favorable and
unfavorable media coverage of Roosevelt's proposal, the Court's new
pro-New Deal decisions, and the announced resignation ofconservative Justice Van Devanter, affected levels of public support for the
plan. 7 Using multiple regression, he found that there was indeed
a strong relationship between these variables, with support for
court packing dropping once it became clear that the Court would
not continue to overturn New Deal legislation."8
Unfortunately, however, Caldeira's analysis implicitly assumes
the eighteen Gallup polls (his dependent variable) were perfectly
accurate, an unreasonable assumption even for modern surveys and
certainly so for surveys of the 1930s. 9 This is a particularly serious
Leuchtenburg, supra note 244, at 396-400.
254. See BAKER, supra note 244, at 31.
255. See supra notes 245, 252-53 and accompanying text.
256. See Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's CourtPackingPlan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139 (1987).
257. Id at 1140-47.
258. 1& at 1147-49.
259. See CONVERSE, supra note 234, at 124-27.
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problem given that opposition to the President's plan ranged only
from 41% to 49% during the entire period in question,' a range of
variance that might have been entirely due to random chance,
assuming a mean level of opposition of about 46% (the actual mean
of Caldeira's observations) and a mean error of 4% in either
direction. Support for the plan varied somewhat more, from 31% to
46% (the remaining respondents had "no opinion"), 2"' but even here
measurement error might have had a substantial effect. Moreover,
the fact that there were only eighteen data points implies that a
large measurement error in even a few of the observations might
substantially skew the results. 2
Overall, the court-packing episode, like the previous two cases,
presents a picture of political leaders operating as if they faced an
ignorant rather than a well-informed public. This result is particularly significant in that the court-packing episode is considered an
especially clear-cut case of constitutional conflict by many historians, 2M and it is so understood by Ackerman.2 ' Even at the height
of the New Deal constitutional crisis, therefore, political leaders saw
opportunities for manipulation more than shackles of constraint.
E. Deception and Knowledge Reconsidered
The finding that extensive and apparently successful efforts to
deceive voters occurred during all three of the cases examined
raises several additional issues that require discussion. First, one
could argue that increased efforts at deception by elites were, in
fact, a response to a real or perceived increase in voter knowledge.
Obviously, it requires more effort to deceive a well-informed
audience than a comparatively ignorant one. If this analysis is
correct, evidence of efforts at deception might, to an extent, confirm
the Ackerman hypothesis rather than refute it.
Such an interpretation cannot be ruled out completely, but two
strong considerations militate against the conclusion that it
seriously undermines my main thesis. First, the sheer scale of the
deception and the fundamental nature of the issues it addressed
suggest that the elites involved did not perceive themselves to be
facing a highly informed electorate. In all three cases, the deceptions in question addressed matters that were fundamental to the
260.
261.
262.
263.

Caldeira, supra note 256, at 1146.
I
See id at 1145.
See, e.g., BAERM,
supra note 244, at 1-38; LEUCHTEURG, supra note 90, at 82-162;

Leuchtenburg, supra note 244, at 347.
264. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2, supra note 14, at 335-37.
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issue at hand and also well understood by political elites. Certainly,
even a moderately informed person was unlikely to take seriously
the claim that the NIRA was intended to be merely a temporary
emergency measure, 2' or the claim that the court-packing plan was
proposed to ease the workload of the aging justices.' The fact that
elites in the cases studied were engaged in bigger deceptions over
more important issues than usually occur in normal politics
suggests that the increased effort at deception was not the result of
any perceived increase in voter knowledge, but merely an indication
that it may take more effort to bring off a "big lie" than a small one.
Second, even if the counterargument in question were correct,
the implications for the heightened attention hypothesis are
still unfavorable. If voter knowledge increased enough to cause a
corresponding increase in elites' efforts at deception, but not enough
to impose actual additional constraints on their substantive policy
choices, the claim that We the People' impose greater control on
political leaders during periods of constitutional change would still
be invalidated. Furthermore, an increase in voter knowledge that
was so small that it could be overcome by attempts at deception
that would be pierced easily with even a modicum of knowledge is
unlikely to have been a very great increase in the first place.
While neither the quantitative evidence of voter ignorance nor
the qualitative evidence of elite political strategy is by itself
definitive, the cumulative weight of both points strongly to the
conclusion that the rational ignorance hypothesis is much closer to
the truth than its rival. The last Part of this Article considers some
of the broader implications of this finding.
VI. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

The results of this study pose a challenge to legal scholars who
advocate circumventing Article V of the Constitution in favor of
procedures that allow greater majoritarian popular participation
in constitution-making. 2 Such criticisms reassert earlier majoritarian attacks on Article V that date back to the Founding Era.'
265. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.

266. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
267. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7; ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2, supra
note 14.
268. The two most prominent advocates of greater majoritarian popular participation in
constitution making are Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Reed Amar. See generally sources cited
supra note 14.
269. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Anti-Federalist
criticism of Article V, see supra text accompanying notes 19-20. Ackerman proposes a kind
of compromise between Article V and pure majoritarianism. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
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Although these writers have at least some arguments in favor of
their proposals that are independent of the state of voter knowledge,27 ° the idea that majoritarian amendment processes better
reflect the popular will than the cumbersome, supermajoritarian
Article V system is surely one of their most important claims. Both
Ackerman and Amar explicitly emphasize the importance of voter
knowledge and deliberation to their theories.27 1 Their claims are
called into serious question by the evidence assembled in this
Article.
In addition to the purely negative conclusion that New Deal-era
constitutional change was not occasioned by heightened public
attention and knowledge,27 2 my analysis points to several potential
normative pitfalls of non-Article V constitutional change, and to a
possible consequent defense of the much-maligned Article V.
A. Inattention to Broad, Long-Term Consequences of Change
Ackermanian non-Article V constitutional changes are usually
adopted in a crisis atmosphere occasioned by an overwhelming
imminent threat. This was certainly true of New Deal-era change,
driven by the horrendous impact of the Great Depression.' In such
a situation, voter attention may well be focused on addressing the
immediate crisis rather than on the broader and more long-term
implications of any proposed constitutional changes. This danger
may arise even with a well-informed electorate. Voters may
conclude rationally that they care more about solving their
immediate problems than any long-term dangers, the burden of
which will fall primarily on future generations.

1, supra note 7, at 53-56; ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2, supra note 14, at 410; Ackerman,
ConstitutionalPolitics,supra note 14. He favors allowing a second-term president to propose

a constitutional amendment that, if approved by a majority of Congress, would enter the
Constitution if supported by a majority vote, nationwide referendum. See, e.g.,ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE 2, supra note 14, at 410. This proposal, whatever its merits, is still much closer
to majoritarianism than to Article V's supermajoritarianism, for it may result in the
successful adoption of a constitutional amendment supported by only a modest majority of the
public. Moreover, Ackerman also contends that majoritarian amendment processes outside
Article V must be allowed to operate unless and until his proposal is adopted. Id. at 420.
270. See, e.g., Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 14. Amar and Ackerman both
argue that their positions are sanctioned by the history and original intent of the Constitution
as well as by democratic theory. See works by Amar and Ackerman cited supra note 14.

271. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 285-88 (emphasizing the
importance of voter information and considered deliberation in times of constitutional
change); Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 14, at 501-03 (emphasizing importance

of informed "deliberation" as an element of non-Article V constitutional change).
272. See supra Part V.
273. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 268-69.
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The problem is, however, exacerbated if the electorate is substantially ignorant. In such a situation, political leaders can exploit
voter ignorance by portraying major long-term structural changes
as mere temporary emergency measures. As we have seen, this is
exactly what happened with the NIRA, the single most revolutionary new policy adopted during the New Deal.274 In addition, voter
ignorance also exacerbates the problem of inattention to long-term
consequences of constitutional change because these consequences
may require more knowledge to understand and evaluate them than
is necessary for ordinary policy changes.
On an even broader scale, voter ignorance might enable leaders
to avoid openly discussing the issue of constitutional change
altogether. Strikingly, Roosevelt and the Democrats were able to do
just that during the 1936 election, and during much of the courtpacking battle.276
B. Exploitation by Interest Groups
The second danger posed by allowing rationally ignorant political
majorities to control the amendment process is the threat of interest
group exploitation. Economists and political scientists have long
warned that well-organized interest groups are often able to hijack
the political process for their own benefit, at the expense of the
less organized general public."6 Indeed, part of the appeal of
Ackerman's thesis resided precisely in the possibility that increased
political knowledge on the part of the general public would make
such interest group shenanigans less likely during a constitutional
moment.277 Once we recognize, however, that voter knowledge
does not seem to increase in periods of constitutional change, the
resulting picture seems much more bleak. Even more so than
periods of normal politics, Ackermanian constitutional moments
may provide opportunities for interest group capture of the political
process.
Periods of constitutional change provide interest groups with
unusual opportunities for two reasons. First, the atmosphere of
emergency and crisis loosens existing constitutional and political
constraints on legislative actionY This occurs both because a grave
crisis such as the Great Depression may call the validity of the
274. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.

275. See supra text accompanying notes 245-52.
276. For the classic account, see OLSON, LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 37.

277. See ACKERMA, WE THE PEOPLE 1, supra note 7, at 271.
278. See Michael R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX.
L. REv. 67, 68-69 (1983).
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existing constitutional system into question in the minds of many,2 79
and because the crisis enables interest groups to portray even major
new policy initiatives as merely temporary emergency measures. 280
The history of the NIRA provides examples of both of these
dynamics, as does that of some other New Deal policies."'
The second critical factor providing heightened opportunities for
interest groups is the unusually great complexity of major constitutional issues. Those issues involving the scope of broad governmental powers, such as the federal government's power to regulate
economic activity-the principal point at issue in the New Deal
era-are especially complex. Unlike issues of normal politics, which
usually involve the merits of a discrete policy choice, disputes over
the general scope of governmental power address the desirability of
giving a particular level of government the authority to enact an
entire range of policies, the details of which may not even be known
at the time the constitutional change is being considered. As argued
above, these and other aspects of constitutional change make it
much more difficult for rationally ignorant voters to use traditional
"shortcuts" to political knowledge to assess broad, proposed changes
in the constitutional order.' In turn, the difficulty of assessment
makes it easier for organized interests to exploit the process.
Obviously, not all policies favored by organized interests, and
potentially opposed by the broad mass of voters, are necessarily
malign. For example, it is certainly possible to argue that the NLRA
was normatively justified despite the fact that its main purpose-the strengthening of labor unions and the guarantee of the
right to strike-was opposed by the majority of the public at the
time.' Some instances of interest group capture of the political
process may be beneficial, but this should not blind us to the danger
that allowing such capture on a systematic basis may well result in
a great deal more harm than good to the interests of the majority of
the public. At the very least, such systematic capture conflicts with
most traditional normative theories of democracy that emphasize
the importance of participation in policymaking by a broad and
informed electorate.' Obviously, the harms of capture are greater
when the resulting policy is enshrined as a fundamental part of the
constitutional order rather than just as ordinary legislation.

279. See David J. Hulsebosch, Note, The New Deal Court: Emergence of a New Reason, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1973,1974-77 (1990) (discussing the perceived need for constitutional change).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 193-96.
281. See supra Part V.B.
282. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
283. For normative defenses and criticisms of the NLRA, see sources cited supranote 209.
284. See supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text.
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C. Voter Ignorance as a Possible Defense of Article V
A full assessment of the normative status of the Article V
amendment process obviously would reach well beyond the scope of
this Article. My findings do suggest, nonetheless, a possible
argument in favor of Article V's stringent supermajority requirements that scholars have ignored in the previous literature on the
subject.' As one of the Article's critics points out, "[bly requiring
the concurrence of both national and state legislatures, Article V
comes close to requiring unanimity to approve any amendment as
a practical matter."'
This much criticized supermajority requirement may well, at
least from the standpoint of mitigating the dangers of voter
ignorance, actually be an advantage. Although studies of voter
knowledge historically have found that most of the public is
severely ignorant,287 they have also shown that an important
minority of voters, ranging from 5% to perhaps as many
as 15 or
20%, is much better informed than the average citizen.' By
requiring a massive supermajority to enact constitutional change,
Article V effectively prevents enactment of any amendment that
fails to win the support of at least a high proportion of this informed
minority. In turn, this makes it difficult to enact an amendment
merely through the manipulation of voter ignorance. Even if only a
small minority of voters is informed enough to see through the
amendment's advocates' campaign of deception, that minority may
well be large enough to block its enactment.
The usefulness of Article V's supermajority requirements as a
defense against the exploitation of voter ignorance does not, of
course, rebut the many different attacks that have been leveled at
the Article. 9 It does not even show that Article V is the best
possible amendment process for minimizing problems of voter
ignorance. Nonetheless, it provides a new and important consideration in favor of a stringent supermajority procedure for constitutional amendments and perhaps even for some other types of
legislative decisions.'
285. The argument developed here has been ignored by the defenders of Article V no less
than by critics. For works by the defenders, see supra note 22.
286. Griffin, supra note 14, at 172.
287. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
288. See, eg., NEUMAN, supra note 78, at 33 (calculating that about 12% of the population
is adequately informed).
289. For a thorough survey of criticisms of Article V from the Founding Era to the present,
see VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS, supra note 16.
290. For a wide-ranging recent defense of the various supermajority requirements in the
Constitution, see John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
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To demonstrate that non-Article V processes of constitutional
change are seriously flawed from the standpoint of obtaining
informed public consent is not, of course, to demonstrate that such
processes should never be used. It is certainly possible that, for any
given change, its substantive normative merits may outweigh any
defects in the process of enactment.
The more flawed a nation's status quo constitutional system is,
the more likely it is that any potential change will be for the better.
A severely defective constitution might well be improved even by a
process of change that is seriously compromised by voter ignorance;
in extreme cases, major improvements can be achieved even by a
process of change that is not democratic at all. To take a particularly dramatic example, the present constitutional structure of the
Federal Republic of Germany was, in considerable part, forcibly
imposed by the Western Allies during the occupation of Germany
after World War II." Yet few would argue that the resulting
constitutional change was not a massive improvement over what
came before.
Even with a severely flawed constitution, however, it may still be
desirable to create an amendment process that incorporates
safeguards against voter ignorance. Such safeguards can still
increase the likelihood that the resulting changes will be for the
better. After all, if post-World War II Germany shows us that even
a seriously flawed process change can alter a constitutional system
for the better, the history of the Weimar Republic shows that the
manipulation ofvoter ignorance can help replace a bad constitution
with something much worse. 2
The problem of voter ignorance is not the only factor that needs
to be considered in designing a system for handling constitutional
Constitution, 80 TEX L. REV. 703 (2002). McGinnis and Rappaport deploy a variety of
arguments but only briefly consider the possible significance of voter ignorance. See id. at 788.
They argue that the difficulty of placing a proposed amendment on the public agenda under
Article V reduces knowledge costs by enabling the electorate to focus its attention on those

few proposals that actually have a chance of passage. Id. The shortcoming of this argument
is that the public's attention may be diverted away from a proposed amendment by
nonconstitutional as well as constitutional issues. Thus, a strategic interest group actor
seeking to manipulate public attention might introduce nonconstitutional legislative proposals

to divert attention away from its constitutional ones. The pro-Article V argument presented
by McGinnis and Rappaport nonetheless complements that developed in this Article.
291. For a detailed account, see PETER H. MERKL, TiE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN

REPUBLIC (1963). Although German political leaders had a substantial say in designing the
new constitution, id at 21, the German public's participation was severely constrained by the
Allies' ban on the Nazi Party and other extreme nationalist groups which, at that time, still

enjoyed the support of large portions of the West German population. Id at 22-24.
292. For a description of the simplistic but effective appeals that the Weimar-era Nazis
made to gain the support of voters, see Peter Fritzsche, Germans Into Nazis 197-214 (1998);

see also RICHARD F. HAMILTON, WHO VOTED FOR HITLER? (1982).
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change. It is, however, one that has been unduly neglected by both
political scientists and legal scholars.
CONCLUSION

The relationship between voter knowledge and constitutional
change is a complex one, unlikely to be explained definitively by the
present study. Nonetheless, I have found strong evidence in favor
of the rational ignorance hypothesis and against the heightened
attention theory.2 ' Both quantitative analyses of voter knowledge
and qualitative study of elite perceptions and strategy point to the
same conclusion. Their cumulative weight is significant, even if no
one piece of evidence can be considered definitive.
Obviously, further research is necessary to determine whether
my conclusion is applicable beyond the New Deal context. Such
research should include both analyses of other "constitutional
moments" in American history and studies of constitutional change
abroad. I plan to extend this study with analyses of constitutional
change in the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s.' If the results of this
study hold up in other contexts, they may become important
implications for theories of constitutional change and for theories
of the growth of government. They will also pose a serious
challenge to legal scholars who advocate circumventing the
cumbersome amendment procedures ofArticle V of the Constitution
in favor of greater majoritarian popular participation in constitution making.295
With respect to theories of the growth of government in times of
crisis, the present study suggests a potential way to plug a hole in
their reasoning. The reason why voters fail to block overreaching by
officials seeking to expand their powers beyond what is necessary
to resolve the crisis is that they may be unaware of what is going
on.
Overall, the problem ofvoter knowledge is a major underanalyzed
issue in the theory of constitutional change. In time, its empirical
implications may greatly revise our understanding of both the
New Deal and other critical episodes in our history. Its normative
dangers pose an important-and as yet unmet---challenge to
democratic theory.

293. See supra Part IV.
294. For a survey of constitutional and legal developments during the Civil Rights Era, see
HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIvIL RIGH s ERA: ORIGINS AND DEvWLOPmE
OF NATIONAL
POLICY 1960-1972, at 3-8 (1990).
295. See sources cited supra note 14.
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Appendix A: New Deal-Relevant Knowledge Questions
from the 1952 National Election Study
Q. 520046 NOW, HOW DO YOU THINK THE TWO PARTIES
FEEL ABOUT

THIS QUESTION [whether the "national government"
should "do more" to address such "problems as unemployment, education, housing, and so on"]. - DO YOU
THINK THERE ARE ANY DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN
PARTIES ON THIS ISSUE, OR WOULD YOU SAY
THEY FEEL THE SAME. (HOW IS THAT.)
...

°...............................................

COMPARATIVE SCALE BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC
AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES
77

1.

443

2.

621
47

3.
4.

0

5.

489
222

8.
9.

Q. 520098

DEMOCRATS WILL DO A LOT
MORE THAN REPUBLICANS
DEMOCRATS WILL DO MORE
THAN REPUBLICANS
PRO-CON, SAME
DEMOCRATS WILL DO LESS
THAN REPUBLICANS
DEMOCRATS WILL DO A LOT
LESS THAN REPUBLICANS
DID NOT KNOW
NA, OR NO PRE-ELECTION
INTERVIEW

NAME-PERCEIVED NEGRO VOTE
NOW I'D LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS
ABOUT HOW YOU THINK OTHER PEOPLE
WILL VOTE IN THIS ELECTION.
FOR INSTANCE, TAKE NEGROES - DO YOU
THINK NEGROES AROUND THE COUNTRY
WILL VOTE MOSTLY REPUBLICAN,
MOSTLY DEMOCRATIC, OR DO YOU THINK
THEY WILL BE ABOUT EVENLY SPLIT.
593
266
173

1.
2.
3.

DEMOCRATIC
SPLIT
REPUBLICAN

755
112

8.
9.

DID NOT KNOW
NA, OR NO PRE-ELECTION
INTERVIEW
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Q. 520097

NAME-PERCEIVED WORKING CLASS VOTE
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NOW, HOW ABOUT WORKING-CLASS PEOPLE - DO YOU THINK THEY WILL VOTE

MOSTLY REPUBLICAN, MOSTLY
DEMOCRATIC, OR DO YOU THINK
THEYWILL BE ABOUT EVENLY SPLIT.
893
439
149

1.
2.
3.

DEMOCRATIC
SPLIT
REPUBLICAN

306
112

8.
9.

DID NOT KNOW
NA, OR NO PRE-ELECTION
INTERVIEW

Q. 520100

NAME-PERCEIVED BIG BUSN VOTE
COLUMNS
NUMERIC
MD=GE 8

317 - 317

Q.44. 5. PERCEIVED VOTE OF BIG BUSINESS
<FOR FULL QUESTION TEXT SEE Q. No.
97>

Q. 520101

217
157
983

1.
2.
3.

DEMOCRATIC
SPLIT
REPUBLICAN

429
113

8.
9.

DID NOT KNOW
NA, OR NO PRE-ELECTION
INTERVIEW

NAME-PERCEIVED LABOR UN VOTE
PERCEIVED VOTE OF LABOR UNION MEMBERS
<FOR FULL QUESTION TEXT SEE Q. No.

97>

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:595

1082
211
81

1.
2.
3.

DEMOCRATIC
SPLIT
REPUBLICAN

410
115

8.
9.

DID NOT KNOW
NA, OR NO PRE-ELECTION
INTERVIEW

Q. 520103

NAME-PERCEIVED CATHOLIC VOTE
NOW, HOW ABOUT PEOPLE IN DIFFERENT
RELIGIOUS
GROUPS, LIKE PROTESTANTS,
CATHOLICS, AND JEWS - FOR INSTANCE,
HOW ABOUT CATHOLICS - DO YOU THINK
CATHOLICS AROUND THE COUNTRY WILL
VOTE MOSTLY REPUBLICAN, MOSTLY
DEMOCRATIC, OR DO YOU THINK THEY
WILL BE ABOUT EVENLY SPLIT.
299
445
140

1.
2.
3.

DEMOCRATIC
SPLIT
REPUBLICAN

878
137

8.
9.

DID NOT KNOW
NA, OR NO PRE-ELECTION
INTERVIEW

Q. 520104

NAME-PERCEIVED JEWISH VOTE
<FOR FULL QUESTION TEXT SEE Q. NO. 103>
202
337
145

1.
2.
3.

DEMOCRATIC
SPLIT
REPUBLICAN

1082
133

8.
9.

DID NOT KNOW
NA, OR NO PRE-ELECTION
INTERVIEW

20031

673

ASSESSING THE NEW DEAL EXPERIENCE

Appendix B:
Regression Results from the 1960 National Election Study
New Deal "t Age" Model lU60 NES
UL regession
Model
Unstandardized Std. Standardized Stat Significance
Beta
Error Beta
(Constant)
-5.547E-02
.420
-. 132 .895
Region

-.339

.134

-.098

-2.531 .012

.143
.259

.048
.106

.135
.095

2.959
2.444

Family Income .133

.028

.216

4.759

.185

.083

.086

ex (female=l -.531

.111

-. 183

.000
.025
-4.806 .000

trength of

8.130E-02

.056

.056

1.459 .145

.137

.127

.042

1.085

.278

.307

.525

.030

.585

.559

(South=1)

Education
Interest in

.003
.015

Politics
TV

Rce (black=1) 7.898E-02

.323

.012

2.243
.245

.807

arty ID

ew Deal
of age=1)

outhern
lack

Dependent Variable: Knowledge (New Deal related) n=623

New Deal Cohort Model 1960 NES

1 52

OLS regression

Model

Unstandardized Std.

Constant)

Beta
8.922E-02

Error Beta
.403

.222

Region

-.343

.134

-.099

-2.568 .010

.138
.247

.048
.106

.131
.091

2.888
2.338

Family Incom .140

.028
.082
.110
.320
.520

.228

4.962

.089

2.332

-.186
.007
.038

.000
.020
-4.908 .000
.137
.891
.754 .451

7.897E-02

.056

.055

1.419

-.226

.125

-.069

-1.805 .072

Standardized T Stat Significance
.825

South=1)

Education
Interest in

.004
.020

Politics
TV

.192

ex (female=1) -.540
ce (black=1) 4.386E-02
outhern
.392
lack

trength of

.156

arty ID

New Deal
ohort

Dependent Variable: Knowledge (New Deal Related) n=623 r 2=.141

674

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:595

New Deal-Related Knowledge: Frequency Distribution
Number Correct
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
Total

Frequency
88
128
162
142
143
52

Percent
12.3
17.9
22.7
19.9
20.0
7.3

715

100.0

Cumulative Percent
12.3
30.2
52.9
72.7
92.7
100.0

